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Abstract 
Computers  and  Thought  are  the  two  categories 
that  together  define  Artificial  Intelligence  as  a 
discipline.  It is generally accepted  that work  in 
Artificial  Intelligence  over  the  last  thirty  years 
has  had  a  strong  influence  on  aspects  of com­
puter architectures.  In this paper we also make 
the  converse  claim;  that  the  state  of computer 
architecture has been a strong influence on our 
models of thought.  The Von Neumann model of 
computation  has  lead  Artificial  Intelligence  in 
particular  directions.  Intelligence  in  biological 
systems is completely  different.  Recent work  in 
behavior­based  Artificial  Intelligence  has  pro­
duced new models of intelligence that are much 
closer  in  spirit  to  biological systems.  The  non­
Von  Neumann  computational  models  they  use 
share many characteristics with biological com­
putation, 
1  Introduction 
Artificial  Intelligence  as  a  formal  discipline  has  been 
around  for  a  little  over  thirty  years.  The  goals  of  in­
dividual  practitioners  vary  and  change  over  time.  A 
reasonable  characterization  of  the  general  field  is  that 
it  is  intended  to  make  computers  do  things,  that  when 
done by  people,  are described  as having indicated intel­
ligence.  Winston  [Winston  84]  characterizes  the goals 
of Artificial  Intelligence  as  both  the  construction of use­
ful  intelligent  systems  and  the  understanding  of human 
intelligence. 
There is a temptation (often succumbed to) to then go 
ahead  and  define  intelligence,  but  that  does  not  imme­
diately  give  a  clearly  grounded  meaning  to  the  field.  In 
fact there is danger of deep philosophical regress with  no 
recovery.  Therefore I prefer to stay with a more informal 
notion  of intelligence being the sort  of stuff that  humans 
do,  pretty much  all  the time. 
1.1  Approaches 
Traditional  Artificial  Intelligence  has  tried  to  tackle  the 
problem  of  building  artificially  intelligent  systems  from 
the top down.  It tackled intelligence through the notions 
of  thought  and  reason.  These  are  things  we  only  know 
about  through  introspection.  The  field  has  adopted  a 
certain  modus  operandi over  the years,  which  includes a 
particular set of conventions on how the  inputs and out­
puts  to  thought  and  reasoning  are  to  be  handled  (e.g., 
the subfield of knowledge  representation),  and  the sorts 
of things that  thought  and  reasoning do (e.g,,  planning, 
problem solving,  etc.).  1  will  argue  that  these  conven­
tions  cannot  account for  large  aspects of what  goes  into 
intelligence.  Furthermore, without those aspects the va­
lidity  of the traditional  Artificial Intelligence  approaches 
comes  into  question.  I  will  also  argue  that  much  of the 
landmark  work  on  thought  has  been  influenced  by  the 
technological constraints of the available computers,  and 
thereafter these  consequences have often  mistakenly be­
come enshrined as principles,  long after  the original im­
petus has  disappeared. 
From an evolutionary stance, human  level intelligence 
did  not  suddenly  leap  onto  the  scene.  There  were  pre­
cursors  and  foundations  throughout  the  lineage  to  hu­
mans.  Much of this substrate is present in other animals 
today.  The  study  of  that  substrate  may  well  provide 
constraints on how higher level  thought in  humans could 
be organized. 
Recently  there  has  been  a  movement  to  study  intel­
ligence  from  the  bottom  up,  concentrating  on  physical 
systems (e.g., mobile robots), situated  in  the world, au­
tonomously  carrying out  tasks of various sorts.  Some of 
this  work  is  based  on  engineering  from  first  principles, 
other parts of the work are  firmly  based on  biological  in­
spirations.  The flavor of this work  is quite different from 
that  of traditional  Artificial  Intelligence.  In  fact  it  sug­
gests that despite our best introspections, traditional Ar­
tificial  Intelligence  offers  solutions  to  intelligence  which 
bear  almost no  resemblance  at  all  to how  biological sys­
tems  work. 
There are of course dangers in studying biological sys­
tems  too closely.  Their  design  was  not  highly  optimized 
from  a global  systems  point  of view.  Rather  they  were 
patched  together  and  adapted  from  previously  working 
systems, in ways which most expeditiously met the latest 
environmental pressures.  Perhaps the solutions found for 
much  of intelligence  are  terribly  suboptimal.  Certainly 
there are many  vestigial structures surviving within  hu­
mans'  and  other  animals'  digestive,  skeletal,  and  mus­
cular  systems.  One should  suppose  then  that  there  are 
many vestigial neurological structures,  interactions,  and 
side effects.  Their emulation may be  a distraction. 
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The body of this paper is formed  by  ivemain sections:  2 
Robots,  3  Computers,  4  Biology,  5  Ideas and  6  Thought. 
The  theme  of the  paper  is  how  computers  and  thought 
have  be intimately  intertwined in  the development of Ar­
tificial Intelligence, how  those  connections may  have led 
the  field  astray,  how  biological  examples  of intelligence 
are  quite  different  from  the  models  used  by  Artificial 
Intelligence,  and  how  recent  new  approaches  point  to 
another  path  for  both  computers  and  thought. 
The  new  approaches  that  have  been  developed  re­
cently  for  Artificial  Intelligence  arose  out  of work  with 
mobile  robots.  Section  2  (Robots)  briefly  outlines  the 
context within which this work arose, and discusses some 
key  realizations  made by  the researchers  involved. 
Section  3  (Computers)  traces  the  development  of the 
foundational  ideas  for  Artificial  Intelligence,  and  how 
they  were  intimately  linked  to  the  technology  avail­
able  for  computation.  Neither  situatedness  nor  embod­
iment  were  easy  to  include  on  the  original  agenda,  al­
though  their  importance  was  recognized  by  many  early 
researchers­  The  early  framework  with  its  emphasis  on 
search  has  remained  dominant,  and  has led  to solutions 
that seem important within  the closed  world of Artificial 
Intelligencej  but  which  perhaps  are  not  very  relevant  to 
practical  applications.  The  field  of Cybernetics  with  a 
heritage of very different tools from the early digital com­
puter,  provides  an  interesting  counterpoint,  confirming 
the hypothesis that  models of thought are intimately tied 
to  the  available  models  of computation. 
Section  4 (Biology) is  a brief overview of recent devel­
opments  in  the  understanding  of biological  intelligence. 
It  covers  material  from  ethology,  psychology,  and  neu­
roscience.  Of  necessity  it  is  not  comprehensive,  but  it 
is  sufficient  to  demonstrate  that  the  intelligence  of bio­
logical systems is organized  in  ways  quite  different from 
traditional  views  of Artificial  Intelligence. 
Section  5  (Ideas)  introduces  the  two  cornerstones  to 
the  new  approach  to  Artificial  Intelligence,  situatedness 
and  embodiment,  and  discusses  both  intelligence  and 
emergence  in  these contexts. 
The  last  major  section,  6  (Thought),  outlines  some 
details  of  the  approach  of  my  group  at  MIT  to  build­
ing  complete  situated,  embodied,  artificially  intelligent 
robots.  This  approach shares  much  more  heritage  with 
biological  systems  than  with  what  is  usually  called  Ar­
tificial  Intelligence. 
2  Robots 
There  has  been  a scattering of work  with  mobile  robots 
within  the  Artificial  Intelligence  community  over  the 
years.  Shakey  from  the  late  sixties  at  SRI  (see  [Nils­
son  84]  for  a  collection  of original  reports)  is  perhaps 
the  best  known,  but  other significant  efforts  include  the 
CART ([Moravec  82])  at  Stanford  and  Hilare ([Giralt, 
Chatila  and  Vaisset  84])  in  Toulouse. 
All  these systems  used  offboard  computers  (and  thus 
they could be the largest most powerful computers avail­
able  at the time and  place),  and all operated  in mostly
1 
1In  the case of Shakey,  experiments included  the  existence 
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static  environments.  All of these  robots  operated  in  en­
vironments  that  had  been  specially  engineered  for  them 
to some  degree  at  least.  They  all sensed  the world  and 
tried  to  build  two or  three  dimensional  world  models  of 
it.  Then,  in  each  case,  a  planner  could  ignore  the  ac­
tual  world,  and operate in  the model  to produce a plan 
of action  for  the  robot  to  achieve  whatever  goal  it  had 
been  given.  In  all  three  of these  robots,  the  generated 
plans included at least a nominal path through the world 
model along which it was intended that the robot should 
move. 
Despite the simplifications (static, engineered environ­
ments,  and  the  most  powerful  available  computers)  all 
these robots operated excruciatingly slowly.  Much of the 
processing time  was  consumed  in  the perceptual  end  of 
the systems and in building the world models.  Relatively 
little  computation was  used  in  planning and  acting. 
An  important  effect  of  this  work  was  to  provide  a 
framework  within  which  other  researchers  could operate 
without testing their ideas on real robots, and even with­
out  having  any  access  to  real  robot  data.  We  will  call 
this  framework,  the  sense­modeI­p!an­act  framework, or 
SMPA  for short.  See section  3.6  for  more  details of how 
the  SMPA  framework  influenced  the  manner  in  which 
robots were built over the following years, and how those 
robots in turn imposed restrictions on the ways in which 
intelligent  control  programs  could  be  built  for  them. 
There was at least an implicit assumption in this early 
work  with  mobile  robots,  that  once  the  simpler  case  of 
operating in a static environment  had been  solved,  then 
the  more  difficult  case  of an  actively  dynamic  environ­
ment  could  be  tackled.  None  of these  early  SMPA  sys­
tems were ever extended  in this  way. 
Around  1984,  a  number  of  people  started  to  worry 
about  the  more  general  problem  of  organizing  intelli­
gence.  There  was  a  requirement  that  intelligence  be 
reactive  to  dynamic  aspects  of  the  environment,  that 
a  mobile  robot  operate  on  time  scales  similar  to  those 
of  animals  and  humans,  and  that  intelligence  be  able 
to generate  robust  behavior  in  the face of uncertain sen­
sors, an unpredicted environment, and a changing world. 
Some  of  the  key  realizations  about  the  organization  of 
intelligence were as follows: 
•  Most  of  what  people  do  in  their  day  to  day  lives 
is  not  problem­solving  or  planning,  but  rather  it  is 
routine activity  in  a relatively  benign,  but certainly 
dynamic,  world.  Furthermore  the  representations 
an  agent  uses of objects in  the world  need  not  rely 
on a semantic correspondence with symbols that the 
agent  possesses,  but  rather  can  be  defined  through 
interactions  of  the  agent  with  the  world.  Agents 
of a gremlin who would secretly come and alter the environ­
ment  by  moving  &  block  to  a different  location.  However, 
this  would  usually  happen  only  once,  Bay,  in  a many  hour 
run, and the robot would  not perceive the dynamic act, but 
rather might later notice a changed world if the change was 
directly  relevant  to  the  particular  subtask it  was executing. 
In  the case  of the  CART,  the  only  dynamic  aspect  of the 
world  was  the change in  sun  angle over long time periods, 
and this in fact caused the robot to fail as its position esti­
mation scheme was confused by the moving shadows. based on  these  ideas  have  achieved  interesting per­
formance  levels  and  were  built  from  combinatorial 
circuits  plus  a  little  timing  circuitry  ([Agre  and 
Chapman  87],  [Agre  and  Chapman  90]). 
•  An  observer  can  legitimately  talk  about  an  agent's 
beliefs  and  goals,  even  though  the  agent  need  not 
manipulate symbolic data structures at run time.  A 
formal  grounding  in  semantics  used  for  the  agent's 
design can be compiled away.  Agents based on these 
ideas  have  achieved  interesting  performance  levels 
and  were  built  from  combinatorial  circuits  plus  a 
little  timing  circuitry  ([Rosenschem  and  Kael­
bling  86],  [Kaelbling  and  Rosenschein  90]). 
•  In  order  to  really  test  ideas  of intelligence  it  is  im­
portant  to  build  complete  agents  which  operate  in 
dynamic  environments  using  real  sensors.  Internal 
world  models  which  are  complete  representations of 
the external  environment,  besides  being  impossible 
to obtain,  are not  at  all  necessary for  agents  to act 
in  a  competent  manner.  Many  of  the  actions  of 
an  agent  are  quite  separable­—coherent  intelligence 
can  emerge  from  subcomponents  interacting  in  the 
world,  Agents  based  on  these  ideas  have  achieved 
interesting  performance  levels  and  were  built  from 
combinatorial  circuits  plus  a  little  timing  circuitry 
([Brooks  86],  [Brooks  90b],  [Brooks  91a]). 
A  large number of others  have  also contributed  to  the 
approach.  [Maes  90a]  is the most representative collec­
tion. 
There  is  no  generally  accepted  term  to  describe  this 
style  of  work.  It  has  sometimes  been  characterized  by 
the  oxymoron  reactive  planning.  I  have  variously  used 
Robot  Beings  [Brooks  and  Flynn  89]  and  Artificial 
Creatures  [Brooks  90b].  Related  work  on  non­mobile, 
but nevertheless active systems has been called  active vi­
sion,  or  animate  vision  [Ballard  89].  Some  workers  re­
fer to their beings, or creatures, as  agents; unfortunately 
that  term  is  also  used  by  others  to  refer  to  somewhat 
independent  components  of  intelligence  within  a  single 
physical  creature  (e.g,,  the  agencies  of  [Minsky  86]), 
Sometimes  the  approach  is  called  behavior­based as  the 
computational  components  tend  to  be  direct  behavior 
producing  modules
2.  For  the  remainder  of  this  paper, 
we  will  simply  call  the  entities  of discussion  'robots*  or 
'behavior­based  robots'. 
There  are  a number  of key  aspects  characterizing  this 
style  of work. 
•  [Situatedness]  The  robots  are  situated  in  the 
world—they do not  deal  with  abstract  descriptions, 
but  with  the  here  and  now  of the  world  directly  in­
fluencing the  behavior  of the system. 
•  [Embodiment]  The  robots  have  bodies  and  expe­
rience  the  world  directly—their  actions  are  part  of 
a dynamic with  the world and have immediate feed­
back on  their  own  sensations. 
Unfortunately  this  clashes  a  little  with  the  meaning of 
behavior as used  by  ethologists  as  an  observed  interaction 
with the world, rather than as something explicitly generated. 
•  [Intelligence] They are observed to be intelligent— 
but  the  source  of intelligence  is  not  limited  to just 
the  computational  engine.  It  also  comes  from  the 
situation  in  the  world,  the  signal  transformations 
within  the sensors,  and the physical  coupling of the 
robot with  the  world. 
•  [Emergence]  The  intelligence  of  the  system 
emerges  from  the  system's  interactions  with  the 
world and from sometimes  indirect interactions be­
tween its components—it is sometimes hard to point 
to one event or place within the system and say that 
is why  some external action was  manifested. 
Recently  there  has  been  a  trend  to  try  to  integrate 
traditional  symbolic  reasoning,  on  top  of a  purely  reac­
tive  system,  both  with  real  robots  (e.g.,  [Arkin  90], 
[Mitchell  90],)  and  in  simulation  (e,g,  [Firby  89]). 
The  idea  is  that  the  reactive  system  handles  the  real­
time  issues  of being  embedded  in  the  world,  while  the 
deliberative  system  does  the  'hard'  stuff  traditionally 
imagined to be handled by  an Artificial Intelligence sys­
tem.  I  think  that  these  approaches  are  suffering from 
the well known  'horizon  effect'—they  have  bought  a lit­
tle  better  performance  in  their  overall  system  with  the 
reactive  component,  but  they  have  simply  pushed  the 
limitations of the  reasoning system a bit  further into the 
future.  I will not be concerned  with such systems for the 
remainder  of this  paper. 
Before  examining  this  work  in  greater  detail,  we  will 
turn to the reasons why traditional Artificial Intelligence 
adopted such  a different approach. 
3  Computers 
In  evolution  there  is  a  theory  [Gould  and  Eldredge 
77]  of  punctuated  equilibria,  where  most  of  the  time 
there is little change within  a species,  but  at intervals a 
subpopulation  branches  off with  a short  burst  of greatly 
accelerated changes.  Likewise, I believe that in Artificial 
Intelligence research over the last forty or so years, there 
have been long periods of incremental work within estab­
lished  guidelines,  and occasionally  a shift  in orientation 
and  assumptions  causing  a  new  subfield  to  branch  off. 
The  older  work  usually  continues,  sometimes  remaining 
strong, and sometimes dying off gradually.  This descrip­
tion  of the  field  also  fits  more general models of science, 
such as  [Kuhn  70]. 
The  point  of  this  section  is  that  all  those  steady­
state  bodies  of work  rely,  sometimes  implicitly,  on  cer 
tain  philosophical  and  technological  assumptions.  The 
founders  of the  bodies  of work  are  quite  aware  of these 
assumptions, but over time as new people come into the 
fields,  these  assumptions  get  lost,  forgotten,  or  buried, 
and  the  work  takes on  a life of its own  for its own sake. 
In  this  section  I  am  particularly  concerned  with  how 
the  architecture  of our  computers  influences  our  choice 
of problems  on  which  to  work,  our  models  of thought, 
and our algorithms, and how  the problems on which  we 
work,  our  models  of thought,  and  our  algorithm  choice 
puts pressure on the  development of architectures of our 
computers. 
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computation,  within  an  essentially  fixed  topology  net­
work  with  bounded  depth.  Almost  all  Artificial  Intel­
ligence  research,  and  indeed  almost  all  modern  compu­
tation,  runs  on  essentially  Von  Neumann  architectures, 
with a large, inactive memory which can respond at very 
high  speed over an extremely  narrow  channel,  to a very 
high  speed  central  processing  unit  which  contains  very 
little state.  When  connections  to  sensors  and  actuators 
are  also  considered,  the gap  between biological systems 
and our  artificial systems  widens. 
Besides  putting  architectural  constraints  on  our  pro­
grams,  even  our  mathematical  tools  are  strongly  influ­
enced  by  our  computational  architectures.  Most  algo­
rithmic  analysis  is  based  on  the  RAM  model  of  com­
putation  (essentially  a  Von  Neumann  model,  shown  to 
be  polynomially  equivalent  to  a  Turing  machine,  e.g., 
[Hartmanis  71]).  Only in  recent years have  more gen­
eral  models  gained  prominence,  but  they  have  been  in 
the  direction  of  oracies,  and  other  improbable  devices 
for  our  robot  beings. 
Are  we  doomed  to  work  forever  within  the  current 
architectural  constraints? 
Over  the  past  few  centuries  computation  technology 
has  progressed  from  making  marks  on  various  surfaces 
(chiselling,  writing,  etc.),  through  a  long  evolutionary 
chain of purely mechanical systems, then electromechan­
ical relay based systems, through vacuum tube based de­
vices, followed  by  an  evolutionary  chain  of silicon­based 
devices  to  the  current  state  of the  art. 
It would  be  the  height of arrogance  and  foolishness  to 
assume that we are now using the ultimate technology for 
computation,  namely  silicon  based  integrated  circuits, 
just as it would have been foolish  (at. least in  retrospect) 
to assume  in  the  16th  century that  Napier's  Bones were 
the  ultimate  computing  technology  [Williams  83].  In­
deed the end of the exponential increase in  computation 
speed for uni­processors is in sight, forcing somewhat the 
large amount of research into parallel approaches to more 
computation  for  the  dollar,  and  per  second.  But  there 
are other more radical possibilities for changes in compu­
tation infrastructure
3.  These include computation based 
on  optical switching  ([Gibbs  85],  [Brady  90]),  protein 
folding,  gene expression, non­organic atomic switching. 
3.1  Prehistory 
During the early  1940's even while the second world  war 
was being waged, and the first electronic computers were 
being  built for  cryptanalysis and  trajectory calculations, 
the  idea of using  computers  to  carry  out  intelligent  ac­
tivities  was already on  people's  minds. 
Alan  Turing,  already  famous  for  his  work  on  com­
putability  [Turing  37]  had  discussions  with  Donald 
Michie,  as early  as  1943,  and  others less  known  to  the 
modern  Artificial  Intelligence  world  as  early  as  1941, 
about  using  a  computer  to  play  chess.  He  and  others 
developed  the  idea  of minimaxing  a  tree  of moves,  and 
3Equally  radical  changes  have occurred  in  the  past,  but 
admittedly they happened well before the current high levels 
of installed base of silicon­based computers. 
572  Award and Invited Papers 
of static evaluation,  and  carried out elaborate hand sim­
ulations  against  human  opponents.  Later  (during  the 
period from 1945 to 1950 at least) he and Claude Shan­
non  communicated  about  these  ideas
4.  Although  there 
was already an established field of mathematics concern­
ing a theory of games,  pioneered by Von Neumann  [Von 
Neumann  and  Morgenstem  44],  chess  had  such  a 
large  space  of legal  positions,  that  even  though  every­
thing  about  it  is  deterministic,  the  theories  were  not 
particularly  applicable.  Only  heuristic  and  operational 
programs seemed  plausible  means  of attack. 
In  a  paper  titled  Intelligent  Machinery,  written  in 
1948
5, but not published  until long after his death  [Tur­
ing  70],  Turing  outlined  a  more  general  view  of mak­
ing  computers  intelligent.  In  this  rather  short  insight­
ful  paper  he  foresaw  many  modern  developments  and 
techniques.  He  argued  (somewhat  whimsically,  to  the 
annoyance  of  his  employers  [Hodges  83])  for  at  least 
some fields of intelligence,  and  his particular example is 
the  learning of languages,  that  the  machine  would  have 
to be embodied,  and claimed success  "seems however to 
depend rather too much on sense organs and locomotion 
to be  feasible". 
Turing  argued  that  it  must  be  possible  to  build  a 
thinking machine since it was possible to build imitations 
of "any  small  part  of a  man".  He  made  the  distinction 
between producing  accurate electrical  models  of nerves, 
and  replacing  them  computationally  with  the  available 
technology  of vacuum  tube  circuits  (this follows  directly 
from  his  earlier  paper  [Turing  37]),  and  the  assump­
tion  that  the nervous system  can  be modeled  as a com­
putational  system.  For  other  parts of the  body  he  sug­
gests  that  "television cameras, microphones, loudspeak­
ers" , etc., could be used to model the rest of the system. 
"This  would  be  a  tremendous  undertaking  of course." 
Even  so,  Turing  notes  that  the  so  constructed  machine 
"would  still  have  no  contact  with  food,  sex,  sport  and 
many other things of interest to the human being".  Tur­
ing concludes that  the  best  domains  in  which  to explore 
the  mechanization  of  thought  are  various  games,  and 
cryptanalysis,  "in  that  they  require  little  contact  with 
the outside  world"
6. 
Turing  thus  carefully  considered  the  question  of em­
bodiment,  and  for  technical reasons chose  to pursue  as­
pects  of intelligence  which  could  be  viewed,  at  least  in 
his  opinion,  as  purely  symbolic.  Minimax search,  aug­
mented  with  the  idea  of  pursuing  chains  of capture  to 
quiescence,  and  clever  static  evaluation  functions  (the 
4 Norbert Wiener also outlines  the idea of minimax in the 
final  note of the  original  edition  of [Wiener  48].  However 
he  restricts the  idea  to  a depth  of two or  three plays—one 
assumes for practical reasons, as he does express the general 
notion for n  plays.  See Section  3.3  for more details on  the 
ways in  which  cybernetic models of thought  were  restricted 
by the computational models at hand. 
5 Different  sources  cite  1947  and  1948  as  the  time  of 
writing. 
6 Interestingly, Turing did not completely abstract even a 
chess playing machine away from embodiment, commenting 
that  "its only organs need be 'eyes' capable of distinguishing 
the various positions on a specially made board, and means 
for announcing its own  moves". Turochamp  system  of  David  Champernowne  and  Alan 
Turing
7,  [Shannon 50]) soon became the dominant ap­
proach  to  the  problem.  [Newell,  Shaw  and  Simon 
58]  compared all four  known  implemented chess playing 
programs  of  1958  (with  a  total  combined  experience  of 
six  games  played),  including  Turochamp,  and  they  all 
followed  this approach. 
The  basic  approach  of  minimax  with  a  good  static 
evaluation  function  has  not  changed  to  this  day.  Pro­
grams of this  ilk  compete  well with  International  Grand 
Masters.  The best of them,  Deep  Thought [Hsu, Anan­
tharaman,  Campbell  and  Nowatzyk  90],  uses  spe­
cial  purpose  chips for  massive  search  capabilities,  along 
with a skillful evaluation scheme and selective deepening 
to  direct  that  search  better  than  in  previous  programs. 
Although  Turing  had  conceived  of  using  chess  as  a 
vehicle  for  studying  human  thought  processes,  this  no­
tion  has  largely  gotten  lost  along  the  way  (there  are of 
course exceptions, e.g.,  [Wilkins  79] describes a system 
which substitutes chess knowledge for search in the mid­
die  game—usually  there  are  very  few  static evaluations, 
and tree search is mainly to confirm or deny the existence 
of a  mate).  Instead  the  driving  force  has  always  been 
performance,  and  the  most  successful  program  of  the 
day  has  usually  relied on  technological  advances.  Brute 
force  tree  search  has  been  the  dominant  method,  itself 
dominated  by  the amount of bruteness available.  This in 
turn has been  a product of clever harnessing of the latest 
technology available.  Over the years,  the current 'cham­
pion* program has capitalized on the available hardware. 
MacHack­6  [Greenblatt,  Eastlake  and  Crocker  67] 
made  use  of the largest  available fast  memory  (256K  36 
bits  words—about  a  megabyte  or  so,  or  $45  by  today's 
standards)  and  a  new  comprehensive  architecture  (the 
PDP­6) largely influenced  by Minsky and McCarthy's re­
quirements  for  Lisp  and  symbolic  programming.  Chess 
4.0  and  its  descendants  [Slate  and  Atkin  84]  relied 
on  the  running on  the  world's  faster  available computer. 
Belle [Condon and Thompson  84]  used a smaller cen­
tral  computer,  but  had  a custom  move  generator,  built 
from  LSI  circuits.  Deep  Thought,  mentioned  above  as 
the  most  recent  champion,  relies  on  custom  VLSI  cir­
cuits  to  handle  its  move  generation  and  tree  search.  It 
is  clear  that  the  success  and  progress  in  chess  playing 
programs  has  been  driven  by  technology  enabling  large 
tree searches.  Few  would  argue  that  today's  chess  pro­
grams/hardware  systems  are  very  good  models for  gen­
eral  human  thought  processes. 
There  were  some  misgivings  along  the  way,  however. 
In  an  early  paper  [Selfridge  56]  argues  that  better 
static evaluation is the key to playing chess, so that look­
ahead can be limited to a single move except in situations 
close  to  mate  (and  one  assumes  he  would  include  situ­
ations  where  there  is  capture,  and  perhaps  exchanges, 
involved).  But,  he  claims  that  humans  come  to  chess 
with  a significant  advantage over  computers  (the  thrust 
of the paper is on learning, and in this instance on learn­
ing to play  chess)  as they  have concepts such  as Value', 
'double threat',  the  'centre' etc.,  already  formed.  Chess 
7See Personal Computing January 1980, pages 80­81, for 
a description of this hand simulation of a chess machine. 
to Selfridge is not a disembodied exercise, but one where 
successful  play  is  built  upon  a  richness of experience in 
other,  perhaps  simpler,  situations. 
There  is  an  interesting counterpoint  to the  history  of 
computer chess; the game of Go.  The search tree for Go 
is  much  much  larger  than  for  chess,  and  a good  static 
evaluation  function  is  much  harder  to  define.  Go  has 
never  worked  out  well  as  a vehicle  for  research  in  com­
puter  game  playing—any  reasonable  crack  at  it  is much 
more  likely  to  require  techniques  much  closer  to  those 
of human  thought—mere  computer  technology  advances 
are  not  going  to  bring  the  minimax  approach  close  to 
success  in  this  domain  (see  [Campbell  83]  for  a  brief 
overview). 
Before leaving Turing entirely there is one other rather 
significant  contribution  he  made  to  the  field  which  in 
a  sense  he  predated.  In  [Turing  50]  poses  the  ques­
tion  "Can machines think?".  To tease out an  acceptable 
meaning  for  this  question  he  presented  what  has  come 
to  be  known  as  the  Turing  test,  where  a  person  com­
municates in  English over a teletype  with either another 
person  or  a  computer.  The  goal  is  to  guess  whether  it 
is  a  person  or  a  computer  at  the  other  end.  Over  time 
this  test  has  come  to  be  an  informal  goal  of  Artificial 
Intelligence
8.  Notice that it is a totally disembodied view 
of intelligence,  although  it  is  somewhat  situated  in  that 
the machine has to respond  in  a timely fashion to its in­
terrogator.  Turing suggests  that  the machine should  try 
to simulate  a  person  by  taking  extra  time  and  making 
mistakes  with  arithmetic  problems.  This  is  the  version 
of the  Turing  test  that is bandied  around  by current day 
Artificial  Intelligence  researchers
9. 
Turing  advances  a  number  of  strawman  arguments 
against  the  case  that  a digital  computer  might  one day 
be  able  to  pass  this  test,  but  he  does  not  consider  the 
need  that  machine  be  fully  embodied.  In  principle,  of 
course,  he  is  right.  But  how  a  machine  might  be  then 
programmed  is  a  question.  Turing  provides  an  argu­
ment  that  programming the machine  by  hand  would  be 
impractical, so he suggests having it learn.  At this point 
he  brings  up  the  need  to  embody  the  machine  in  some 
way.  He  rejects  giving  it  limbs,  but  suspects  that  eyes 
would  be  good,  although  not  entirely  necessary.  At  the 
end of the paper he  proposes two possible paths towards 
his goal of a  "thinking"  machine.  The  unembodied path 
is  to  concentrate  on  programming  intellectual  activities 
like  chess,  while  the  embodied  approach  is  to  equip  a 
digital computer  "with the best sense organs that money 
can buy,  and  then teach it to understand and speak  En­
glish".  Artificial  Intelligence  followed  the  former  path, 
and has all but ignored  the latter  approach
10. 
8Turing expresses his own belief that it will be possible for 
a machine with 10
9 bits of store to pass a five minute version 
of the test with 70% probability by about the year 2000. 
9In  fact  there  is  a  yearly  competition  with  a  $100,000 
prize for a machine that can pass this version  of the Turing 
test. 
10An  excerpt  from  Turing's  paper is  reprinted  in  [Hofs­
tadter and Dennett 8lJ.  They leave out the whole section 
on learning and embodiment. 
Brooks  573 3.2  Establishment 
The  establishment  of  Artificial  Intelligence  as  a  disci­
pline  that  is  clearly  the  foundation  of today's  discipline 
by  that  name  occurred  during  the  period  from  the  fa­
mous  'Dartmouth  Conference' of 1956  through  the pub­
lication  of the  book  "Computers  and  Thought"  in  1963 
([Feigenbaum  and  Feldman  63]), 
Named  and  mostly  organized  by  John  McCarthy  as 
"The  Dartmouth  Summer  Research  Project  on  Artifi­
cial  Intelligence"  the  six­week  long  workshop  brought 
together  those  who would  establish  and  lead  the  major 
Artificial Intelligence  research  centers in  North  America 
for  the  next  twenty years.  McCarthy jointly  established 
the  MIT  Artificial  Intelligence  Laboratory  with  Marvin 
Minsky,  and  then  went  on  to found  the  Stanford  Artifi­
cial  Intelligence  Laboratory.  Allen  Newell  and  Herbert 
Simon  shaped  and  lead  the  group  that  turned  into  the 
Computer  Science  department  at  Carnegie­Mellon  Uni­
versity.  Even  today  a large  portion  of the researchers in 
Artificial  Intelligence in  North America had  one of these 
four people on  their doctoral committee, or were advised 
by  someone  who  did.  The  ideas  expressed  at  the  Dart­
mouth  meeting have  thus  had  a signal  impact  upon  the 
field  first  named  there. 
As can be seen from interviews of the participants pub­
lished  in  [McCorduck  79]  there  is  still some  disagree­
ment  over  the  intellectual  property  that  was  brought  to 
the conference and its relative significance.  The key out­
come  was  the  acceptance  and  rise  of search  as  the pre­
eminent  tool  of Artificial  Intelligence.  There was a gen­
eral  acceptance  of the  use  of search  to  solve  problems, 
and with  this there  was an essential abandonment of any 
notion  of situatedness. 
Minsky's  earlier  work  had  been  involved  with  neural 
modeling.  His  Ph.D.  thesis at  Princeton  was  concerned 
with  a  model  for  the  brain  [Minsky  54],  Later,  while 
at Harvard he was strongly influenced by McCulloch and 
Pitts (see  [McCulloch and  Pitts  43]), but  by the time 
of the  Dartmouth  meeting he had  become more involved 
with  symbolic  search­based  systems.  In  his  collection 
[Minsky  68]  of  versions  of his  students'  Ph.D.  theses, 
all were concerned to some degree with defining and con­
trolling an  appropriate search space. 
Simon  and  Newell presented  their  recent  work  on  the 
Logic  Theorist  [Newell,  Shaw  and  Simon  57],  a  pro­
gram  that  proved  logic  theorems  by  searching  a tree  of 
subgoals.  The  program  made  extensive  use of heuristics 
to prune its search space.  With this success, the idea of 
heuristic  search  soon  became  dominant  within  the  still 
tiny  Artificial  Intelligence  community. 
McCarthy  was  not  so  affected  by  the  conference that 
he  had organized,  and  continues  to  this  day  to concen­
trate  on  epistemological  issues  rather  than  performance 
programs.  However  he was soon  to invent  the  Lisp  pro­
gramming  language  [McCarthy  1960]  which  became 
the  standard  model of computation  for  Artificial Intelli­
gence.  It  had  great  influence  on  the  models  of thought 
that  were  popular  however,  as  it  made  certain  things 
such  as  search,  and  representations  based  on  individu­
als,  much easier  to program. 
At  the  time,  most  programs  were  written  in  assem­
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bly  language.  It  was  a  tedious  job  to  write  search 
procedures,  especially  recursive  procedures  in  the  ma­
chine  languages  of the  day,  although  some  people such 
as  [Samuel  59]  (another  Dartmouth  participant)  were 
spectacularly  successful.  Newell  and  Simon owed  much 
of  their  success  in  developing  the  Logic  Theorist  and 
their  later  General  Problem Solver  [Newell,  Shaw and 
Simon 59],  to their use of an interpreted language (1PL­
V—see  [Newell,  Shaw  and  Simon  61])  which  sup­
ported  complex  list  structures  and  recursion.  Many  of 
their student's  projects  reported  in  [Feigenbaum  and 
Feldman  63]  also  used  this language. 
McCarthy's  Lisp  was  much  cleaner  and  simpler.  It 
made  processing  lists  of  information  and  recursive  tree 
searches  trivial  to  program­often  a  dozen  lines  of code 
could replace many hundreds of lines of assembler  code. 
Search  procedures  now  became  even  easier  and  more 
convenient to include  in  Artificial  Intelligence programs. 
Lisp  also  had  an  influence on  the  classes  of representa­
tional systems used, as is described in section 3.5. 
In  [Minsky 61], Artificial Intelligence was broken into 
five key  topics:  search,  pattern  recognition,  learning, 
planning  and  induction.  The  second  through  fourth  of 
these  were  characterized  as  ways  of  controlling  search 
(respectively  by  better  selection  of tree  expansion oper­
ators,  by  directing  search  through  previous  experience, 
and by replacing a given search with a smaller and more 
appropriate  exploration).  Again,  most  of  the  serious 
work  in  Artificial  Intelligence  according  to  this  break­
down  was  concerned  with  search­
Eventually,  after  much  experimentation  [Michie  and 
Ross  70], search methods became well understood, for­
malized,  and  analyzed  [Knuth  and  Moore  75],  and 
became  celebrated  as  the  primary  method  of  Artificial 
Intelligence  [Nilsson  71]. 
At the end of the era of establishment, in  1963, Minsky 
generated  an  exhaustive  annotated  bibliography  ([Min­
sky  63])  of literature  "directly  concerned with construc­
tion  of  artificial  problem­solving  systems**
11.  It  con­
tains  925  citations,  890  of  which  are  to  scientific  pa­
pers  and  books,  and  35  of  which  are  to  collections  of 
such papers.  There are two main  points of interest here. 
First,  although the  title of the bibliography,  "A Selected 
Descriptor­Indexed  Bibliography  to  the  Literature  on 
Artificial  Intelligence*
1,  refers  to  Artificial  Intelligence, 
in  his  introduction  he  refers  to  the  area  of  concern  as 
"artificial  problem­solving systems".  Second,  and some­
what paradoxically, the scope of the bibliography is much 
broader  than  one  would  expect  from an  Artificial  Intel­
ligence  bibliography  today.  It  includes  many  items  on 
cybernetics, neuroscience, bionics, information and com­
munication  theory,  and  first  generation  connectionism. 
These  two  contrasting  aspects  of  the  bibliography 
highlight  a  trend  in  Artificial  Intelligence  that  contin­
ued  for  the  next  25  years.  Out  of  a  soup  of ideas  on 
how  to  build  intelligent  machines  the  disembodied  and 
non­situated approach of problem­solving search systems 
emerged  as  dominant,  at  least  within  the  community 
that  referred  to its own  work  as Artificial  Intelligence. 
11 It also acted as the combined bibliography for the papers 
in  [Feigenbaum and  Feldman  63]. With  hindsight  we  can  step  back  and  look  at  what 
happened.  Originally search was introduced  as a mech­
anism  for  solving  problems  that  arguably  humans  used 
some search in solving.  Chess and logic theorem proving 
are two examples we have already discussed.  In these do­
mains one does not expect  instantaneous responses from 
humans  doing  the same  tasks.  They  are  not  tasks  that 
are situated  in the world. 
One can  debate whether even  in  these  tasks it is  wise 
to  rely  so  heavily  on  search,  as  bigger  problems  will 
have  exponentially  bad  effects  on  search  time—in  fact 
[Newell,  Shaw  and  Simon  58]  argue  just  this,  but 
produced  a  markedly  slower  chess  program  because  of 
the  complexity  of static  evaluation  and  search  control. 
Some,  such  as  [Samuel  59]  with  his  checker's  play­
ing  program,  did  worry  about  keeping  things  on  a  hu­
man  timescale.  [Slagle  63]  in  his symbolic  integration 
program,  was  worried  about  being  economically  com­
petitive  with  humans,  but  as  he  points  out  in  the  last 
two  paragraphs  of  his  paper,  the  explosive  increase  in 
price/performance  ratio for  computing  was  able  to  keep 
his programs ahead.  In general, performance increases in 
computers  were  able  to feed  researchers  with  a steadily 
larger search space, enabling them to feel that they were 
making  progress  as  the  years  went  by.  For  any  given 
technology  level,  a  long­term  freeze  would  soon  show 
that  programs  relying  on  search  had  very  serious  prob­
lems,  especially  if there  was  any  desire  to  situate  them 
in  a dynamic  world. 
In  the  last  paragraph  of  [Minsky  61]  he  does  bring 
up the possibility of a situated agent,  acting as a  "think­
ing  aid"  to  a  person.  But  again  he  relies  on  a  perfor­
mance  increase  in  standard  computing  methods  (this 
time  through  the introduction of time sharing)  to supply 
the  necessary  time  relevant  computations. 
In  the  early  days  of the  formal  discipline  of Artificial 
Intelligence,  search  was  adopted  as  a basic  technology. 
It  was  easy  to  program  on  digital  computers.  It  lead  to 
reasoning systems  which  are  not  easy  to  shoe­horn  into 
situated  agents. 
3.3  Cybernetics 
There  was,  especially  in  the  forties  and  fifties,  another 
discipline  which  could  be  viewed  as  having  the  same 
goals as we have identified for Artificial Intelligence—the 
construction  of useful  intelligent systems  and  the  under­
standing  of  human  intelligence.  This  work,  known  as 
Cybernetics,  had  a  fundamentally  different  flavor  from 
the  today's  traditional  Artificial  Intelligence. 
Cybernetics  co­evolved  with  control  theory  and  sta­
tistical  information  theory—e.g.,  see  [Wiener  48,  61]. 
It  is  the  study  of  the  mathematics  of  machines,  not  in 
terms  of  the  functional  components  of  a  machine  and 
how  they  are  connected,  and  not  in  terms  of  what  an 
individual machine can do here and now, and but rather 
in  terms  of  all  the  possible  behaviors  that  an  individ­
ual machine can  produce.  There was  a strong emphasis 
on  characterizing  a  machine  in  terms  of its  inputs  and 
outputs, and treating it as a black box as far as its inter­
nal  workings  were  unobservable.  The  tools  of analysis 
were  often  differential  or  integral  equations,  and  these 
tools  inherently  limited  cybernetics  to  situations  where 
the  boundary  conditions  were  not  changing  rapidly.  In 
contrast,  they often  do so in  a system situated  in  a dy­
namically  changing  world—that  complexity  needs  to go 
somewhere; either into discontinuous models or changed 
boundary  conditions. 
Cybernetics  arose  in  the  context  of regulation  of ma­
chinery  and electronic  circuits—it  is  often  characterized 
by  the  subtitle  of Wiener's  book  as  the  study  of  "con­
trol and communication in the animal and the machine". 
The model of computation at  the  time of its original  de­
velopment was  analog.  The  inputs  to  and  outputs from 
the machine  to  be  analyzed  were  usually  thought  of as 
almost everywhere continuous functions  with  reasonable 
derivatives,  and  the mechanisms for automated  analysis 
and  modeling  were  usually  things  that  today  would  be 
characterized  as analog  components.  As such there was 
no  notion  of symbolic  search—any  search  was  couched 
in  terms  of minimization  of a  function.  There  was  also 
much  less  of  a  notion  of representation  as  an  abstract 
manipulable  entity  than  was  found  in  the  Artificial  In­
telligence  approaches. 
Much  of the  work  in  Cybernetics  really  was  aimed  at 
understanding  animals  and  intelligence.  Animals  were 
modeled  as  machines,  and  from  those  models,  it  was 
hoped  to  glean  how  the  animals  changed  their  behav­
ior  through  learning,  and how  that  lead  to better  adap­
tation  to  the  environment  for  the  whole  organism.  It 
was recognized  rather early  (e.g.,  [Ashby  52] for an ex­
plicit  statement)  that  an  organism  and  its  environment 
must  be  modeled  together  in  order  to  understand  the 
behavior  produced  by  the  organism—this  is  clearly  an 
expression  of situatedness.  The  tools  of feedback  analy­
sis were used ([Ashby 56]) to concentrate on such issues 
as  stability  of the  system  as  the  environment  was  per­
turbed,  and  in  particular  a system's  homeostasis or abil­
ity  to keep  certain  parameters within  prescribed  ranges, 
no  matter  what  the  uncontrolled  variations  within  the 
environment. 
With  regards  to  embodiment  there  were  some  exper­
iments  along  these  lines.  Many  cybernetic  models  of 
organisms were rather  abstract  demonstrations of home­
ostasis,  but  some  were  concerned  with  physical  robots, 
(Walter  50,  51,  53]
l 2  describes  robots  built on  cyber­
netic principles which  demonstrated goal­seeking behav­
ior, homeostasis,  and  learning  abilities. 
The complexity and abilities of Walter's physically em­
bodied machines rank with  the purely  imaginary ones in 
the first  half dozen  chapters  of [Braitenberg  84]  three 
decades  later. 
The limiting factors in these experiments were twofold; 
(1)  the technology of building small self contained robots 
when the computational elements were miniature (a rel­
ative  term)  vacuum  tubes,  and  (2)  the  lack  of mecha­
nisms for  abstractly describing  behavior at  a level  below 
the complete behavior, so that an  implementation could 
reflect  those  simpler  components,  Thus  in  the  first  in­
12Much  of  the  book  [Walter  53]  is  concerned  with  early 
work on electroencephalography  and  hopes  for its  role in  re­
vealing  the  workings  of  the  brain—forty  years  later  these 
hopes do not seem  to  have  been  born  out. 
Brooks  575 stance the models of thought  were  limited  by  technolog­
ical  barriers  to  implementing  those  models,  and  in  the 
second  instance,  the  lack of certain  critical  components 
of a model  (organization into submodules)  restricted  the 
ability  to  build  better  technological  implementations. 
Let us return to Wiener and analyze the ways in which 
the  mechanisms  of cybernetics,  and  the  mechanisms  of 
computation were intimately interrelated in deep and self 
limiting  ways. 
Wiener was  certainly aware of digital  machines
13  even 
in his earlier edition of [Wiener 48].  He compared them 
to  analog  machines  such  as  the  Bush  differential  ana­
lyzer,  and  declares  that  the  digital  (or  numerical,  as  he 
called  them)  machines  are superior  for  accurate  numeri­
cal calculations.  But in some deep sense Wiener did  not 
see the  flexibility  of these machines.  In an added chapter 
in  [Wiener  61)  he discussed  the  problem of building  a 
self reproducing  machine,  and  in  the  Cybernetic  tradi­
tion,  reduced  the problem to modeling the input/output 
characteristics  of a black  box,  in  particular  a  non­linear 
transducer.  He  related  methods  for  approximating  ob­
servations  of  this  function  with  a  linear  combination  of 
basis non­linear  transducers,  and  then  showed  that  the 
whole  problem  could  be  done  by  summing  and  multi­
plying  potentials  and  averaging over  time.  Rather  than 
turn  to a digital computer to do this he stated  that there 
were some interesting  possibilities for multiplication  de­
vices  using  pieso­electric  effects.  We  see  then  the  in­
timate  tying  together  between  models  of  computation, 
i.e.,  analog computation,  and  models of the essentials of 
self­re  product  ion.  It  is  impossible  to  tease  apart  cause 
and effect from this  vantage point.  The  critical point  is 
the  way  in  which  the  mathematical  proposal  is  tied  to 
a  technological  implementation  as  a  certification  of the 
validity  of the  approach
14. 
By  the mid sixties it was clear  that  the study  of intel­
ligence,  even  a study  arising  from  the  principles  of cy­
bernetics,  if it  was to succeed  needed  to be more broad­
based in  its levels of abstraction and  tools of analysis.  A 
good example is [Arbib 64]
15.  Even so, he still harbors 
l 3ln  the  introduction  to  [Wiener  48]  he  talks  about  em­
bodying  such  machines  with  photoelectric  cells,  thermome­
ters,  strain  gauges  and  motors  in  the  service  of  mechanical 
labor.  But,  in  the  text of the  book  he  does  not  make such  a 
connection  with  models  of organisms.  Rather  he  notes  that 
they are intended  for many successive runs,  with  the memory 
being  cleared  out  between  runs  and  states  that  "the  brain, 
under  normal  circumstances, is not  the complete  analogue of 
the  computing  machine  but  rather  the  analogue  of  a  single 
run  on  such  a  machine".  His  models  of digital  computation 
and  models  of  thought  are  too  dis­similar  to  make  the  con­
nection  that  we would  today. 
14With  hindsight,  an  even  wilder  speculation  is  presented 
at  the  end  of  the  later  edition.  Wiener  suggests  that  the 
capital  substances  of  genes  and  viruses  may  self  reproduce 
through  such  a spectral  analysis  of infra­red  emissions  from 
the  model  molecules  that  then  induce  self  organization  into 
the  undifferentiated  magma of amino and  nucleic  acids  avail­
able  to  form  the  new  biological  material. 
Arbib includes an elegant warning against being too com­
mitted to models, even mathematical models, which may turn 
out  to  be  wrong.  His  statement  that  the  "mere  use  of  for­
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hope  that  cybernetic  methods  may  turn  out  to  give  an 
understanding of the  "overall coordinating and integrat­
ing  principles"  which  interrelate  the component subsys­
tems of the  human  nervous system. 
3.4  Abstraction 
The years  immediately following the  Dartmouth confer­
ence  shaped  the  field  of Artificial  Intelligence  in  a  way 
which has not significantly changed.  The next few years, 
in  the main, amplified the abstraction away from situat­
edness,  or  connectedness  to  the  world
16.  There  were  a 
number  of demonstrations  along  the  way  which  seemed 
to  legitimize  this  abstraction.  In  this  section  I  review 
some of those  events,  and  argue that  there were  funda­
mental flaws in  the  conclusions  generally drawn. 
At MIT [Roberts  63]  demonstrated  a vision program 
that  could  match  pre­stored  models  to  visual  images  of 
blocks  and  wedges.  This program was the forerunner of 
all  modern  vision  programs,  and  it  was  many  years be­
fore its performance could be matched by others.  It took 
a grey level image of the world,  and extracted a cartoon­
like line drawing.  It  was this line drawing that was then 
fitted,  via  an  inverse  perspective  transform  to  the  pre­
stored  models.  To those  who saw  its  results  this looked 
like a straightforward and natural  way to process images 
and  to build  models  (based on  the  prestored  library)  of 
the objective  reality  in  front  of the  camera. 
The  unfortunate  truth  however,  is  that  it  is  extra­
ordinarily  difficult  to  extract  reliable  line  drawings  in 
any sort of realistic cases of images.  In  Roberts' case the 
lighting  was  carefully  controlled,  the  blocks  were  well 
painted,  and  the background was chosen with care.  The 
images of his blocks produced rather complete line draw­
ings  with  very  little  clutter  where  there  should,  by  hu­
man  observer  standards,  be  no  line  elements.  Today, 
after  almost  thirty  years of research  on  bottom­up, top­
down,  and  middle­out  line  finders,  there  is  still  no line 
finder  that  gets  such  clean  results  on  a  single  natural 
image.  Real world images are not at all the clean things 
that  our  personal  introspection  tells  us  they  are.  It  is 
hard  to  appreciate  this  without  working  on  an  image 
yourself
17. 
The  fallout  of  Roberts'  program  working  on  a  very 
controlled  set  of  images  was  that  people  thought  that 
the line detection problem  was  doable  and  solved.  E.g., 
[Evans  68]  cites  Roberts  in  his  discussion of how input 
could obtained  for his  analogy program which  compared 
sets  of line  drawings  of 2­D geometric  figures. 
During the late sixties  and  early seventies  the Shakey 
project  [Nilsson  84]  at  SRI  reaffirmed  the  premises  of 
abstract  Artificial  Intelligence.  Shakey,  mentioned  in 
section  2,  was  a  mobile  robot  that  inhabited  a  set  of 
mulas gives no magical powers to a theory" is just as timely 
today as it was then. 
16One  exception was a computer controlled  hand built at 
MIT, [Ernst 61], and connected to the TX­0 computer.  The 
hand was very much situated and embodied, and relied heav­
ily on the external world as a model, rather than using inter­
nal representations.  This piece of work seems to have gotten 
lost, for reasons that are not clear to me. 
17Try it!  Youll be amazed at how bad it is. specially  prepared  rooms.  It  navigated  from  room  to 
room,  trying  to satisfy  a goal  given  to it on  a teletype. 
It would, depending on the goal and circumstances, nav­
igate around obstacles consisting of large painted blocks 
and wedges, push  them out of the  way, or  push them to 
some desired  location. 
Shakey  had  an  onboard  black  and  white  television 
camera as its primary sensor.  An offboard computer an­
alyzed the images, and merged descriptions of what was 
seen into an existing first order predicate calculus model 
of the  world.  A  planning  program,  STRIPS,  operated 
on  those  symbolic  descriptions  of the  world  to  generate 
a sequence of actions for Shakey.  These plans were trans­
lated  through a series of refinements into calls to atomic 
actions in fairly  tight feedback loops with atomic sensing 
operations using Shakey's other sensors such  as a bump 
bar  and  odometry. 
Shakey  was  considered  a  great  success  at  the  time, 
demonstrating  an  integrated  system  involving  mobility, 
perception,  representation,  planning, execution, and er­
ror  recovery. 
Shakey's  success  thus  reaffirmed  the  idea  of  relying 
completely  on  internal  models  of an  external  objective 
reality.  That  is  precisely  the  methodology  it  followed, 
and  it  appeared  successful.  However,  it  only  worked 
because  of very  careful  engineering  of the  environment. 
Twenty  years  later,  no  mobile  robot  has  been  demon­
strated  matching  all  aspects  of Shakey's  performance in 
a  more general  environment,  such  as  an  office  environ­
ment. 
The rooms in which Shakey operated were bare except 
for  the large  colored  blocks  and  wedges.  This made the 
class  of objects  that  had  to  be  represented  very  simple. 
The walls  were  of a uniform color,  and  carefully lighted, 
with  dark  rubber  baseboards,  making  clear  boundaries 
with  the lighter colored  floor.  This  meant that very sim­
ple  and  robust  vision  of trihedral  corners  between  two 
walls  and  the  floor,  could  be  used  for  relocalizing  the 
robot  in  order  to correct for  drift  in  the  robot's odomet­
ric  measurements.  The  blocks  and  wedges were  painted 
different colors on different planar surfaces.  This ensured 
that it was relatively easy, especially  in  the good lighting 
provided, to find edges in  the images separating the sur­
faces,  and  thus  making  it  easy  to  identify  the  shape  of 
the  polyhedron.  Blocks  and  wedges  were  relatively  rare 
in  the environment,  eliminating problems  due  to partial 
obscurations.  The  objective  reality  of  the  environment 
was  thus  quite  simple,  and  the  mapping  to  an  internal 
model  of that  reality  was  also  quite  plausible. 
Around  the same  time  at  MIT a major  demonstration 
was  mounted  of a  robot  which  could  view  a scene  con­
sisting of stacked  blocks,  then  build  a copy  of the scene 
using a robot arm (see  [Winston  72]—the program was 
known as  the  copy­demo).  The  programs to do this  were 
very  specific  to  the  blocks  world,  and  would  not  have 
worked  in  the  presence  of simple  curved  objects,  rough 
texture  on  the  blocks,  or  without  carefully  controlled 
lighting.  Nevertheless  it reinforced  the  idea that  a com­
plete three dimensional  description of the world could be 
extracted from a visual image.  It legitimized  the work of 
others, such as [Winograd 72], whose programs worked 
in  a make­believe world of blocks—if one  program could 
be  built  which understood such  a world  completely  and 
could  also  manipulate  that  world,  then  it  was  assumed 
that  programs  which  assumed  that  abstraction  could  in 
fact  be  connected  to  the  real  world  without  great  diffi­
culty.  The problem remained of slowness of the programs 
due to the large search spaces, but as before, faster com­
puters  were  always just  around  the  corner. 
The  key  problem  that  I  see  with  all  this  work  (apart 
from the use of search) is that it relied on the assumption 
that  a  complete  world  model  could  be  built  internally 
and  then  manipulated.  The  examples  from  Roberts, 
through  Shakey  and  the  copy­demo  all  relied  on  very 
simple  worlds,  and  controlled situations.  The  programs 
were  able  to largely  ignore  unpleasant  issues  like sensor 
uncertainty,  and  were  never  really  stressed  because  of 
the carefully  controlled  perceptual  conditions.  No com­
puter  vision  systems  can  produce  world  models  of this 
fidelity  for  anything  nearing  the  complexity  of  realistic 
world  scenes—even  object  recognition  is  an  active  and 
difficult  research  area.  There  are  two  responses  to this: 
(1)  eventually  computer  vision  will  catch  up  and  pro­
vide  such  world  models—I  don't  believe  this  based  on 
the biological evidence presented below, or (2)  complete 
objective  models  of  reality  are  unrealistic—and  hence 
the  methods  of  Artificial  Intelligence  that  iely  on  such 
models  are  unrealistic. 
With  the  rise  in  abstraction  it  is  interesting  to  note 
that  it  was  still  quite  technologically  difficult  to  con­
nect  to  the  real  world  for  most  Artificial  Intelligence 
researchers
18.  For  instance,  [Barrow  and  Salter  70] 
describe efforts  at  Edinburgh,  a major  Artificial  Intelli­
gence center, to connect sensing to action, and the results 
are extraordinarily primitive by today's standards—both 
MIT  and  SRI  had  major  engineering  efforts  in  support 
of their successful activities.  [Moravec 81]  relates a sad 
tale  of frustration  from  the  early  seventies  of  efforts  at 
the  Stanford  Artificial  Intelligence  Laboratory  to  build 
a simple  mobile  robot  with  visual  input. 
Around  the  late  sixties  and  early seventies  there  was 
a  dramatic  increase  in  the  availability  of computer  pro­
cessing power  available  to researchers  at  reasonably  well 
equipped  laboratories.  Not  only  was  there  a  large  in­
crease  in  processing  speed  and  physical  memory,  but 
time  sharing  systems  became  well  established.  An  in­
dividual  researcher  was  now  able  to  work  continuously 
and  conveniently on a disembodied program designed to 
exhibit  intelligence.  However,  connections  to  the  real 
world  were  not  only  difficult  and  overly  expensive,  but 
the  physical  constraints  of  using  them  made  develop­
ment of the  'intelligent' parts of the system slower by  at 
least an order of magnitude, and probably two orders, as 
compared  to  the  new  found  power  of timesharing.  The 
computers clearly  had  a potential  to influence  the  mod­
els of thought used—and certainly that hypothesis is not 
18It  is  still  fairly  difficult  even  today.  There  are  very few 
turnkey  systems  available  for  purchase  which  connect  sen­
sors  to  reasonable  computers,  and  reasonable  computers  to 
actuators.  The situation  does seem  to  be  rapidly improving 
however—we may well  be just about  to step over a significant 
threshold. 
Brooks  577 contradicted  by  the sort of micro­world  work  that  actu­
ally  went  on. 
3.5  Knowledge 
By  this  point  in  the  history  of  Artificial  Intelligence, 
the  trends,  assumptions,  and  approaches  had  become 
well  established.  The  last  fifteen  years  have  seen  the 
discipline  thundering  along  on  inertia  more  than  any­
thing else.  Apart  from  a  renewed  flirtation  with  neural 
models (see section 3.8 below)  there has been very little 
change  in  the  underlying  assumptions  about  the  mod­
els  of thought.  This  coincides  with  an  era of very  little 
technical innovation in our underlying models of compu­
tation. 
For  the  remainder  of section  3,  I  rather  briefly  review 
the  progress  made  over  the  last  fifteen  years,  and show 
how  it  relates  to  the  fundamental  issues  of situatedness 
and  embodiment  brought  up  earlier. 
One problem with micro­worlds is that they  are some­
what uninteresting.  The blocks world was the most pop­
ular micro­world and there is very little that can  be done 
in  it  other  than  make  stacks  of blocks.  After  a  flurry  of 
early work where particularly difficult 'problems' or 'puz­
zles'  were  discovered  and  then  solved  (e.g.,  [Sussman 
75))  it became  more  and more  difficult  to do something 
new  within  that  domain. 
There  were  three  classes of responses  to this impover­
ished  problem space: 
•  Move  to  other  domains  with  equally  simple  seman­
tics,  but  with  more  interesting  print  names  than 
block­a  etc.  It  was  usually  not  the  intent  of the  re­
searchers  to  do  this,  but  many  in  fact  did  fall  into 
this trap.  [Winograd  and  Florcs  86]  expose  and 
criticize  a number of such  dressings  up in  the chap­
ter  on  "Understanding  Language". 
•  Build  a  more  complex  semantics  into  the  blocks 
world and work on the new problems which arise.  A 
rather heroic  example of this  is  [Fahlman  74]  who 
included balance, multi­shaped blocks, friction, and 
the like.  The problem with this approach is that the 
solutions to the  'puzzles'  become so domain specific 
that  it  is  hard  to  see  how  they  might  generalize  to 
other  domains. 
•  Move  to  the  wider  world.  In  particular,  represent 
knowledge about the everyday world, and then build 
problem solvers, learning systems, etc., that operate 
in  this  semantically  richer  world. 
The  last  of  these  approaches  has  spawned  possibly 
the largest recognizable subfield of Artificial Intelligence, 
known as Knowledge Representation.  It has its own con­
ferences.  It  has theoretical  and  practical  camps.  Yet,  it 
is  totally  ungrounded.  It  concentrates  much  of its ener­
gies on anomalies within formal systems  which are never 
used  for  any  practical  tasks. 
[Brachman  and  Levesque  85]  is  a collection of pa­
pers in the area.  The knowledge representation systems 
described  receive  their  input  either  in  symbolic  form or 
as the  output of natural  language  systems.  The goal of 
the  papers  seems  to  be  to  represent  'knowledge'  about 
the  world.  However  it  is  totally  ungrounded.  There  is 
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very  little  attempt  to  use  the  knowledge  (save  in  the 
naive  physics  [Hayes  85),  or  qualitative  physics  [de 
Kleer and  Brown  84]  areas—but note that these areas 
too  are  ungrounded).  There  is  an  implicit  assumption 
that someday  the inputs  and  outputs will  be  connected 
to something which  will make  use of them (see  [Brooks 
91a]  for  an earlier  criticism of this approach). 
In the  meantime  the  work  proceeds with  very little to 
steer  it,  and  much  of it  concerns  problems  produced  by 
rather  simple­minded  attempts  at  representing  complex 
concepts.  To  take  but  one  example,  there  have  been 
many  pages  written  on  the  problem  of  penguins  being 
birds, even though  they  cannot fly. The reason that this 
is  a  problem  is  that  the  knowledge  representation  sys­
tems are built on top of a computational technology that 
makes convenient the use of very simple individuals (Lisp 
atoms)  and placing links between  them.  As pointed out 
in  [Brooks  90b],  and  much  earlier  in  [Brooks  91a], 
such  a simple approach does not work  when the system 
is  to  be  physically  grounded  through  embodiment.  It 
seems pointless to try to patch  up a system which in the 
long run cannot possibly work.  [Dreyfus 81]
19  provides 
a  useful  criticism of this  style of work. 
Perhaps  the  pinnacle  of  the  knowledge­is­everything 
approach can be found in [Lenat  and Feigenbaum 91] 
where  they  discuss  the  foundations  of a  10­year  project 
to  encode  knowledge  having  the  scope  of a  simple  en­
cyclopedia.  It  is  a  totally  unsituated,  and  totally  dis­
embodied  approach.  Everything  the  system  is  to  know 
is  through  hand­entered  units  of 'knowledge',  although 
there is some hope expressed  that later  it will be able to 
learn  itself by reading.  [Smith  91]  provides a commen­
tary on this approach, and points out how the early years 
of the project have been devoted to finding a more prim­
itive  level  of knowledge  than  was  previously  envisioned 
for  grounding  the  higher  levels  of  knowledge.  It  is  my 
opinion,  and  also  Smith's,  that  there  is  a fundamental 
problem still and one can expect continued  regress  until 
the system has  some  form  of embodiment. 
3.6  Robotics 
Section  2  outlined  the  early  history  of  mobile  robots. 
There  have  been  some  interesting  developments  over 
the  last  ten  years  as  attempts  have  been  made  to  em­
body some theories from Artificial Intelligence in  mobile 
robots.  In  this  section  I  briefly  review  some  of the  re­
sults. 
In  the  early  eighties  the  Defense  Advanced  Research 
Projects  Agency  (DARPA)  in  the US,  sponsored  a ma­
jor thrust in building an Autonomous Land Vehicle.  The 
initial task for the vehicle was to run along a paved road 
in daylight using vision as the primary perceptual sense. 
The  first  attempts  at  this  problem  (e.g.,  [Waxman, 
Le  Moigne  and  Srinivasan  )]  followed  the  SMPA 
methodology.  The idea was to build  a three­dimensional 
world  model  of the  road  ahead,  then  plan  a path  along 
it,  including  steering  and  velocity  control  annotations. 
These approaches failed as it was not possible to recover 
accurate  three­dimensional  road  models from  the  visual 
19Endorsement of some  of  Dreyfus'  views  should  not  be 
taken as whole hearted embrace of all his arguments. images.  Even  under  fairly strong assumptions  about  the 
class of roads being followed  the programs would produce 
ludicrously  wrong  results. 
With  the  pressure  of  getting  actual  demonstrations 
of  the  vehicle  running  on  roads,  and  of  having  all  the 
processing  onboard,  radical  changes  had  to made  in  the 
approaches  taken.  Two  separate  teams  came  up  with 
similar  approaches,  [Turk,  Morgenthaler,  Grem­
ban,  and  M a r r a  88]  at  Martin  Marietta,  the  inte­
grating  contractor,  and  [Thorpe,  Hebert,  Kanade, 
and  Shafer  88}  at  CMU,  the  main  academic  partici­
pant  in  the  project,  both  producing  vision­based  navi­
gation  systems.  Both  systems  operated  in  picture  co­
ordinates  rather  than  world  coordinates,  and  both  suc­
cessfully  drove  vehicles  along  the  roads.  Neither  system 
generated three dimensional world models.  Rather, both 
identified  road  regions  in  the images  and servo­ed  the ve­
hicle  to stay  on  the  road.  The systems can be character­
ized  as reactive, situated  and embodied­  [Horswill and 
Brooks  88]  describe  a  system  of similar  vintage  which 
operates  an  indoor  mobile robot under  visual navigation. 
The  shift  in  approach  taken  on  the  outdoor  vehicle  was 
necessitated  by  the  realities  of the  technology  available, 
and  the  need  to  get  things  operational. 
Despite  these  lessons  there  is  still  a strong  bias  to fol­
lowing  the  traditional  Artificial  Intelligence  SMPA  ap­
proach  as  can  be  seen  in  the  work  at  CMU  on  the  Am­
bler  project.  The  same  team  that  adopted  a  reactive 
approach  to  the  road  following  problem  have  reverted  to 
a  cumbersome,  complex,  and  slow  complete  world  mod­
eling  approach  [Simmons  and  Krotkov  91]. 
3.7  Vision 
Inspired  by  the  work  of  [Roberts  63]  and  that  on 
Shakey  [Nilsson  84],  the  vision  community  has  been 
content  to  work  on  scene  description  problems  for  many 
years.  The  implicit  intent  has  been  that  when  the  rea­
soning  systems  of Artificial  Intelligence  were  ready,  the 
vision  systems  would  be  ready  to  deliver  world  models 
as  required,  and  the  two could  be hooked together to get 
a situated,  or  embodied  system. 
There are  numerous problems with  this approach,  and 
too little  room  to treat  them  adequately  within  the space 
constraints  of this  paper.  The  fundamental  issue  is  that 
Artificial  Intelligence  and  Computer  Vision  have  made 
an  assumption  that  the  purpose  of  vision  is  to  recon­
struct  the  static external  world  (for  dynamic  worlds  it  is 
just  supposed  to  do  it  often  and  quickly)  as  a  three  di­
mensional world model.  I do not  believe that  this is pos­
sible  with  the  generality  that  is  usually  assumed.  Fur­
thermore  I  do  not  think  it  is  necessary,  nor  do  I  think 
that  it  is  what  human  vision  does.  Section  4  discusses 
some  of these  issues  a little  more. 
3.8  Parallelism 
Parallel  computers  are  potentially  quite  different  from 
Von  Neumann  machines.  One  might  expect  then  that 
parallel  models  of computation  would  lead  to fundamen­
tally  different  models  of  thought.  The  story  about  par­
allelism,  and  the  influence  of parallel  machines on  mod­
els  of  thought,  and  the  influence  of  models  of  thought 
on  parallel  machines  has  two  and  a  half  pieces.  The 
first  piece  arose  around  the  time of the early cybernetics 
work,  the second  piece exploded  in  the  mid­eighties  and 
we have still to see  all  the  casualties.  The last half piece 
has  been  pressured  by  the  current  models  of thought  to 
change  the  model  of parallelism. 
There  was  a  large  flurry  of  work  in  the  late  fifties 
and  sixties involving linear  threshold  devices,  commonly 
known  as  perceptions.  The  extremes  in  this  work  are 
represented  by  [Rosenblatt  62]  and  [Minsky  and  Pa­
pert  69].  These  devices  were  used  in  rough  analogy  to 
neurons  and  were  to be wired  into networks that learned 
to do  some  task,  rather  than  having  to  be  programmed. 
Adjusting  the  weights  on  the  inputs  of  these  devices 
was  roughly  equivalent  in  the  model  to  adjusting  the 
synaptic  weights  where  axons  connect  to  dendrites  in 
real  neurons—this  is  currently  considered  as  the  likely 
site  of most  learning  within  the  brain. 
The  idea  was  that  the  network  had  specially  distin­
guished  inputs  and  outputs.  Members  of classes  of pat­
terns  would  be  presented  to  the  inputs  and  the  outputs 
would  be  given  a  correct  classification.  The  difference 
between  the correct  response  and  the  actual  response  of 
the  network  would  then  be  used  to  update  weights  on 
the  inputs  of individual  devices.  The  key  driving  force 
behind  the  blossoming  of  this  field  was  the  perceptron 
convergence  theorem  that  showed  that  a  simple  param­
eter  adjustment  technique  would  always  let  a single  per­
ceptron  learn  a  discrimination  if  there  existed  a  set  of 
weights  capable  of making  that  discrimination. 
To  make  things  more  manageable  the  networks  were 
often  structured  as  layers  of  devices  with  connections 
only  between  adjacent  layers.  The  directions  of the  con­
nections  were  strictly  controlled,  so  that  there  were  no 
feedback  loops in  the network  and  that there was a natu­
ral  progression  from  one single  layer  that  would  then  be 
the input layer,  and one layer  would  be the output layer. 
The  problem  with  multi­layer  networks  was  that  there 
was  no  obvious  way  to  assign  the  credit  or  blame  over 
the layers for a correct or  incorrect  pattern  classification. 
In  the  formal  analyses  that  were  carried  out  (e.g., 
[Nilsson  65]  and  [Minsky  and  Papert  69])  only  a 
single  layer of devices which  could  learn,  or  be adjusted, 
were ever considered.  [Nilsson  65]  in  the  later chapters 
did  consider  multi­layer  machines,  but  in  each  case,  all 
but  one  layer  consisted  of  static  unmodifiable  devices. 
There  was  very  little  work  on  analyzing  machines  with 
feedback. 
None  of these  machines  was  particularly  situated,  or 
embodied.  They  were  usually  tested  on  problems set  up 
by  the researcher.  There  were many  abuses of the scien­
tific  method  in  these  tests  the  results  were  not  always 
as  the  researchers  interpreted  them. 
After  the  publication  of  [Minsky  and  Papert  69], 
which  contained  many  negative  results  on  the  capabili­
ties of single  layer  machines,  the  field  seemed  to die out 
for  about  fifteen  years. 
Recently there has been a resurgence in  the field start­
ing  with  the  publication  of  [Rumelhart  and  McClel­
land  86]. 
The  new  approaches  were  inspired  by  a  new  learn­
Brooks  579 ing algorithm  known  as  back propagation  ([Rumelhart, 
Hinton  and  Williams  86]).  This  algorithm  gives  a 
method for assigning credit and blame  in fully connected 
multi­layer  machines  without  feedback  loops.  The  indi­
vidual  devices  within  the  layers  have  linearly  weighted 
inputs  and  a  differentiable  output  function,  a  sigmoid, 
which closely matches a step function, or threshold func­
tion.  Thus they are only slight generalizations of the ear­
lier  perceptrons,  but  their  continuous  and  differentiable 
outputs  enable  hill  climbing  to  be  performed  which  lets 
the  networks  converge  eventually  to  be  able  to  classify 
inputs appropriately as  trained. 
Back propagation has a number of problems; it is slow 
to  learn  in  general,  and  there  is  a  learning  rate  which 
needs  to  be  tuned  by  hand  in  most  cases.  The effect  of 
a  low  learning  rate  is  that  the  network  might  often  get 
stuck  in  local  minima.  The  effect  of  a  higher  learning 
rate  is  that  the  network  may  never  really  converge  as 
it  will  be  able  to jump  out  of  the  correct  minimum  as 
well as  it can jump out of an  incorrect  minimum.  These 
problems  combine  to  make  back  propagation,  which  is 
the  cornerstone  of modern  neural  network  research,  in­
convenient for  use  in embodied  or  situated systems. 
In fact, most of the examples in the new wave of neural 
networks have not been situated or embodied.  There are 
a  few  counterexamples  (e.g.,  [Sejnowksi  and  Rosen­
berg  87],  [Atkeson  89]  and  [Viola  90])  but  in  the 
main  they are not based on  back  propagation.  The most 
successful  recent  learning  techniques  for  situated,  em­
bodied,  mobile  robots,  have  not  been  based  on  parallel 
algorithms  at all—rather  they  use a reinforcement learn­
ing algorithm such  as Q­learning ([Watkins  89])  as for 
example,  [Kaelbling  90]  and  [Mahadevan  and  Con­
nell  90], 
One problem for neural networks becoming situated or 
embodied  is  that  they  do  not  have  a simple  translation 
into  time  varying  perception  or  action  pattern  systems. 
They  need  extensive front and  back ends  to equip  them 
to  interact  with  the  world—all the cited examples above 
had  such  features added  to them. 
Both  waves of neural network  research  have been  her­
alded  by  predictions  of the  demise  of all  other  forms  of 
computation.  It  has  not  happened  in  either  case.  Both 
times  there  has  been  a  bandwagon  effect  where  many 
people  have  tried  to  use  the  mechanisms  that  have  be­
come  available  to  solve  many  classes  of problems,  often 
without  regard  to  whether  the  problems  could  even  be 
solved  in  principle  by  the  methods  used.  In  both  cases 
the enthusiasm for the approach  has been  largely stimu­
lated by  a single piece of technology, first the perceptron 
training  rule,  and  then  the back  propagation  algorithm. 
And  now  for  the  last  half­piece of the  parallel  compu­
tation  story.  The primary  hope for  parallel computation 
helping  Artificial  Intelligence  has  been  the  Connection 
Machine developed  by  [Hillis  85].  This  is a SIMD ma­
chine,  and  as such might be thought to have limited ap­
plicability  for  general  intelligent  activities.  Hillis,  how­
ever,  made  a  convincing  case  that  it  could  be  used  for 
many  algorithms  to  do  with  knowledge  representation, 
and  that  it  would  speed  them  up,  often  to  be  constant 
time  algorithms.  The  book  describing  the  approach  is 
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exciting, and  in fact on pages 4  and  5 of [Hillis 85]  the 
author  promises  to break  the  Von  Neumann  bottleneck 
by  making all  the silicon  in  a machine  actively compute 
all the time.  The argument  is presented that most of the 
silicon in a Von Neumann machine is devoted to memory, 
and most of that is inactive most of the time.  This was a 
brave  new  approach,  but  it has not survived the  market 
place.  New models of the connection machine have large 
local memories (in the order of 64K bits) associated with 
each one bit processor (there can be up to 64K processors 
in  a  single  Connection  Machine).  Once  again,  most  of 
the silicon is inactive most of the time.  Connection ma­
chines are  used within Artificial Intelligence laboratories 
mostly  for  computer  vision  where  there  is  an  obvious 
mapping  from  processors  and  their  NEWS  network  to 
pixels  of standard  digital  images.  Traditional  Artificial 
Intelligence  approaches  are  so  tied  to  their  traditional 
machine  architectures  that  they  have  been  hard  to  map 
to  this  new  sort  of architecture. 
4  Biology 
We have our own  introspection  to  tell  us  how our minds 
work,  and  our  own  observations  to  tell  us  how  the  be­
havior  of other  people  and  of  animals  works.  We  have 
our  own  partial  theories  and  methods  of explanation
20. 
Sometimes,  when  an  observation,  internal  or  external, 
does  not  fit  our  pre­conceptions,  we  are  rather  ready to 
dismiss  it  as  something  we  do  not  understand,  and  do 
not need  to understand. 
In  this  section  I  will  skim  over  a scattering  of recent 
work from ethology, psychology, and neuroscience,  in an 
effort to indicate how deficient our everyday understand­
ing  of  behavior  really  is.  This  is  important  to  realize 
because  traditional  Artificial  Intelligence  has  relied  at 
the  very  least  implicitly,  and  sometimes  quite  explicitly, 
on  these  folk  understandings  of  human  and  animal  be­
havior.  The  most  common  example  is  the  story  about 
getting from Boston  to  California  (or  vice­versa),  which 
sets up an analogy between what a person does mentally 
in order  to  Plan the trip,  and  the means­ends  method  of 
planning.  See  [Agre  91]  for  a more detailed  analysis of 
the  phenomenon. 
4.1  Ethology 
Ethology,  the  study of animal  behavior,  tries  to explain 
the  causation,  development,  survival  value,  and  evolu­
tion  of behavior  patterns  within  animals.  See  [McFar­
land  85]  for  an  easy introduction  to  modern  ethology. 
Perhaps  the  most famous ethologist  was  Niko Tinber­
gen  (closely  followed  by  his  co­Nobel  winners  Konrad 
Lorenz and Karl von Frisch).  His heirarchical view of in­
telligence, described  in  [Tinbergen 51], is often quoted 
by  Artificial  Intelligence  researchers  in  support  of their 
own  hierarchical  theories.  However,  this  approach  was 
meant  to  be  a neurobiologically  plausible  theory,  but  it 
was described  in the  absence  any evidence.  Tinbergen's 
model has  largely  been  replaced  in  modern  ethology  by 
theories  of motivational  competition,  disinhibition,  and 
dominant  and  sub­dominant  behaviors. 
20See [Churchland 86] for a discussion of folk psychology. There  is  no  completely  worked  out  theory  of exactly 
how the  decision  is made  as  to which  behavioral  pattern 
(e.g.,  drinking  or eating)  should  be  active  in  an  animal. 
A  large  number  of experiments  give  evidence  of complex 
internal  and  external  feedback  loops  in  determining  an 
appropriate behavior.  [McFarland  88]  presents a num­
ber of such  experiments and  demonstrates the challenges 
for  the  theories.  The  experimental  data  has  ruled  out 
the  earlier  hierarchical  models  of behavior selection,  and 
current theories share  many common  properties with  the 
behavior­based  approach  advocated  in  this  paper. 
4*2  Psychology 
The  way  in  which  our  brains  work  is  quite  hidden  from 
us.  We  have some introspection,  we believe,  to some as­
pects  of our  thought  processes,  but  there  are  certainly 
perceptual  and  motor  areas  that  we  are  quite  confident 
we  have  no  access  to
21.  To  tease  out  the  mechanisms 
at  work  we  can  do  at  least  two sorts  of experiments:  we 
can  test  the  brain  at  limits  of  its  operational  envelop 
to  see  how  it  breaks  down,  and  we  can  study  damaged 
brains  and  get  a  glimpse  at  the  operation  of previously 
integrated  components.  In  fact,  some  of these  observa­
tions  call  into  question  the  reliability  of any  of our  own 
introspections. 
There  have  been  many  psychophysical  experiments  to 
test  the  limits  of human  visual  perception.  We  are  all 
aware  of  so­called  optical  illusions  where  our  visual  ap­
paratus  seems  to  break  down.  The  journal  Perception 
regularly  carries  papers  which  show  that  what  we  per­
ceive  is  not  what  we  see  (e.g.,  [Ramachandran  and 
Anstis  85]).  For  instance  in  visual  images  of a jump­
ing  leopard  whose  spots  are  made  to  artificially  move 
about,  we perceive them all  as  individually following the 
leopard.  The  straightforward  model  of  human  percep­
tion  proposed  by  [Marr  82],  and  almost  universally  ac­
cepted  by  Artificial  Intelligence  vision  researchers,  does 
not  account  for  such  results.  Likewise  it  is  now  clear 
that  the  color  pathway  is  separate  from  the  intensity 
pathway  in  the  human  visual  system,  and  our  color  vi­
sion  is  something  of  an  illusion
22.  We  are  unaware  of 
these  deficiencies—most  people  are  not  aware  that  they 
have  a blind spot  in each eye  the size of the  image of the 
moon—they  are totally inaccessible  to our  consciousness. 
Even  more surprising, our very  notion of consciousness is 
full  of inconsistencies—psychophysical  experiments show 
that  our  experience  of  the  flow  of  time  as  we  observe 
things  in  the  world  is  an  illusion,  as  we  can  often  con­
sciously  perceive  things  in  a  temporal  order  inconsistent 
with  the  world  as  constructed  by  an  experimenter  (see 
[Dennett  and  Kinsbourne  90]  for  an  overview). 
We  turn  now  to  damaged  brains  to  get  a  glimpse  at 
how  things  might  be  organized.  This  work  can  better 
be  termed  neuropsychology.  There  is  a  large  body  of 
21 This contrasts with a popular fad in Artificial Intelligence 
where  all  reasoning  of a system  is  supposed  to  be available 
to  a  meta­reasoning  system,  or  even  iretrospectively  to  the 
system  itself. 
22See  the techniques used  in  the current trend of 'coloriza­
tion' of black and white movie classics for a commercial cap­
italization  on our  visual deficiencies. 
literature on  this subject  from  which  we  merely  pick out 
just a few instances here.  The purpose is to highlight the 
fact  that  the  approaches  taken  in  traditional  Artificial 
Intelligence  are  vastly  different  from  the  way  the  human 
brain  is organized. 
The  common  view  in  Artificial  Intelligence,  and  par­
ticularly  in  the  knowledge  representation  community,  is 
that  there  is  a  central  storage  system  which  links  to­
gether the information about concepts,  individuals,  cate­
gories, goals, intentions, desires, and whatever else might 
be  needed  by  the  system.  In  particular  there  is  a  ten­
dency  to  believe  that  the  knowledge  is  stored  in  a  way 
that  is  independent  from  the  way  or  circumstances  in 
which  it  was  acquired. 
[McCarthy  and  Warrington  88]  (and  a  series  of 
earlier papers by them and their colleagues)  give cause to 
doubt  this  seemingly  logical  organization.  They  report 
on  a  particular  individual  (identified  as  TOB),  who  at 
an  advanced  age  developed  a  semantic  deficit  in  knowl­
edge  of living  things,  but  retained  a  reasonable  knowl­
edge of inanimate  things.  By  itself,  this sounds perfectly 
plausible—the  semantic  knowledge  might just  be  stored 
in  a  category  specific  way,  and  the  animate  part  of the 
storage  has  been  damaged.  But,  it  happens  that  TOB 
is  able  to  access  the  knowledge  when,  for  example  he 
was  shown  a  picture  of a  dolphin—he  was  able  to  form 
sentences  using  the  word  'dolphin'  and  talk  about  its 
habitat,  its  ability  to  be  trained,  and  its  role  in  the  US 
military.  When  verbally  asked  what  a  dolphin  is,  how­
ever,  he thought  it  was either  a fish  or a bird.  He  has  no 
such  conflict  in  knowledge  when  the  subject  is  a  wheel­
barrow,  say.  The  authors  argue  that  since  the  deficit 
is  not  complete  but  shows  degradation,  the  hypothesis 
that  there  is  a  deficit  in  a  particular  type  of  sensory 
modality  access  to  a  particular  category  subclass  in  a 
single  database  is  not  valid.  Through  a  series  of further 
observations  they  argue  that  they  have  shown  evidence 
of  modality­specific  organization  of  meaning,  besides  a 
category  specific  organization.  Thus  knowledge  may  be 
duplicated  in  many  places,  and  may  by  no  means  be 
uniformly  accessible.  There  are  examples  of where  the 
knowledge  is  shown  to  be  inconsistent.  Our  normal  in­
trospection  does not  reveal  this organization,  and  would 
seem  to  be  at  odds  with  these  explanations.  Below,  we 
call  into  question  our  normal  introspection. 
[Newcombe  and  Ratcliff 89]  present  a  long  discus­
sion  of visuospatial  disorders  in  brain  damaged  patients. 
Many of these  severely  tax  the  model  a  person  as  an  in­
tegrated  rational agent.  One  simple example they report 
is  finger  agnosia,  where  a patient  may  be  quite impaired 
in  the  way  he  can  carry out  conscious  simple  tasks  using 
their  fingers,  but  could  still  do  things  such  as  thread  a 
needle,  or  play  the  piano  well.  This  suggests  the  exis­
tence of multiple parallel  channels of control,  rather  than 
some  centralized  finger  control  box,  for  instance. 
[Teitelbaum,  Pellis  and  Pellis  90]  summarize work 
which shows that rat  locomotion  involves a number of re­
flexes. Drugs  can  be  used  to  shut  off  many  reflexes  so 
that  a rat  will  appear  to be  unable  to  move.  Almost  all 
stimuli  have  no  effect—the  rat  simply  remains  with  its 
limbs  in whatever configuration the experimenter  has ar­
Brooks  581 ranged  them.  However  certain  very  specific stimuli  can 
trigger  a  whole  chain  of  complex  motor  interactions— 
e.g,,  tilting the surface on which  the rats feet are resting 
to  the  point  where  the  rat  starts  to  slide  will  cause  the 
rat  to leap.  There  has also been  a recent  popularization 
of  the  work  of  [Sacks  74]  which  shows  similar  symp­
toms,  in  somewhat  less  understood  detail,  for  humans. 
Again, it is hard to explain these results in terms of a cen­
tralized will—rather an  interpretation of multiple  almost 
independent  agencies such  as hypothesized  by  [Minsky 
86]  seems  a better explanation. 
Perhaps  the  most  remarkable  sets  of results  are  from 
split  brain  patients.  It  has  become  common  knowledge 
that  we  all  possess  a  left  brain  and  a  right  brain,  but 
in  patients whose  corpus  callosum  has been severed they 
really do become separate operational brains in their own 
rights  [Gazzaniga  and  LeDoux  77], 
Through  careful  experimentation  it  is  possible  to  in­
dependently  communicate  with  the  two  brains,  visually 
with  both, and verbally  with  the left.  By setting up  ex­
periments  where  one  side  does  not  have  access  to  the 
information  possessed  by  the  other  side,  it  is  possible 
to  push  hard  on  the  introspection  mechanisms.  It  turns 
out  that  the  ignorant  half  prefers  to  fabricate  explana­
tions for what  is going on,  rather  than  admit  ignorance. 
These  are  normal people  (except  their  brains  are  cut  in 
half),  and  it  seems  that  they  sincerely  believe  the  lies 
they  are  telling,  as  a  result  of confabulations  generated 
during  introspection.  One  must  question  then  the  or­
dinary  introspection  that  goes  on  when  our  brains  are 
intact. 
What  is  the  point  of  all  this?  The  traditional  Arti­
ficial  Intelligence  model  of representation  and  organiza­
tion  along  centralized  lines  is  not  how  people  are  built. 
Traditional  Artificial  Intelligence  methods  are  certainly 
not  necessary for  intelligence  then,  and  so far  they  have 
not  really  been  demonstrated  to  be  sufficient  in  situ­
ated, embodied systems.  The organization of humans is 
by  definition  sufficient—it  is  not  known  at  all  whether 
it  will  turn  out  to  be  necessary.  The  point  is  that  we 
cannot  make  assumptions  of necessity  under  either  ap­
proach.  The  best  we  can  expect  to  do  for  a  while  at 
least,  is to show  that some  approach  is  sufficient to pro­
duce  interesting intelligence. 
4.3  Neuroscience 
The working understanding of the brain among Artificial 
Intelligence researchers seems  to  be  that  it  is  an  electri­
cal  machine  with  electrical  inputs  and  outputs  to  the 
sensors  and  actuators of the  body.  One  can  see  this as­
sumption  made explicit,  for  example,  in  the  fiction  and 
speculative  writing  of professional  Artificial  Intelligence 
researchers  such  as  [Dennett  81]  and  [Moravec  88]. 
This  view,  and  further  reduction,  leads  to the very sim­
ple models of brain used in connectionism ([Rumelhart 
and  McClelland  86]). 
In  fact,  however,  the  brain  is  embodied  with  a much 
more serious  coupling.  The  brain  is situated  in  a soup 
of  hormones,  that  influences  it  in  the  strongest  possi­
ble ways.  It  receives messages encoded  hormonally,  and 
sends  messages  so  encoded  throughout  the  body.  Our 
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electrocentrism,  based  on  our electronic models of com­
putation,  has  lead  us  to  ignore  these  aspects  in  our 
informal  models  of  neuroscience,  but  hormones  play  a 
strong,  almost  dominating,  role  in  determination of be­
havior in both simple  ([Kravitz  88]) and higher animals 
([Bloom 76])
23. 
Real  biological  systems  are  not  rational  agents  that 
take  inputs,  compute  logically,  and  produce  outputs. 
They  are  a  mess  of many  mechanisms  working  in  var­
ious  ways,  out  of which  emerges  the  behavior  that  we 
observe  and  rationalize.  We  can  see  this  in  more  detail 
by  looking  both  at  the  individual  computational  level, 
and  at  the organizational  level of the  brain. 
We do not really know how computation is done at the 
lowest  levels  in  the  brain.  There  is  debate over  whether 
the neuron is the  functional  unit of the nervous system, 
or  whether  a single neuron  can  act  as  a many  indepen­
dent  smaller  units  ([Cohen  and  Wu  90]).  However, 
we  do  know  that  signals  are  propagated  along  axons 
and dendrites at  very  low speeds compared to electronic 
computers,  and  that  there  are  significant  delays  cross­
ing synapses.  The  usual estimates for the computational 
speed of neuronal systems are no more than about 1 Kilo­
Hertz.  This  implies that  the  computations that go on in 
humans to effect actions in  the subsecond range must go 
through only a very limited number of processing steps— 
the  network  cannot  be  very  deep  in  order  to  get  mean­
ingful  results out  on  the  timescales  that  routinely  occur 
for much of human thought.  On the other hand, the net­
works seem incredibly richly connected,  compared to the 
connection  width of either our electronic systems,  or our 
connectionist  models.  For  simple  creatures some  motor 
neurons  are  connected  to  tens  of  percent  of  the  other 
neurons in the animal.  For  mammals motor  neurons are 
typically  connected  to  5,000  and  some  neurons  in  hu­
mans are  connected  to as  many  as  90,000 other neurons 
([Churchland  86]). 
For  one  very  simple  animal  Caenorhabditis  elegans,  a 
nematode, we have a complete wiring diagram of its ner­
vous  system,  including  its  development  stages  ([Wood 
88]).  In  the  hermaphrodite  there  are  302  neurons  and 
56  support  cells  out  of  the  animal's  total  of 959  cells. 
In  the  male  there  are  381  neurons  and  92 support  cells 
out  of a  total  of  1031  cells.  Even  though  the  anatomy 
and  behavior  of this  creature  are  well  studied,  and  the 
neuronal  activity  is  well  probed,  the  way  in  which  the 
circuits  control  the  animal's  behavior  is  not  understood 
very  well at all. 
Given  that even a simple animal is not yet understood 
one  cannot expect  to gain  complete insight into building 
Artificial  Intelligence  by  looking  at  the  nervous  systems 
of complex  animals.  We  can,  however,  get  insight  into 
aspects of intelligent behavior, and some clues about sen­
sory systems  and  motor systems. 
[Wehner  87]  for  instance,  gives  great  insight  into 
23See [Bergland 65] for a history of theories of the brain, 
and  how  they  were  influenced  by  the  current  technologies 
available  to  provide explanatory  power.  Unfortunately  this 
book is marred by the author's own lack of understanding of 
computation which leads him to dismiss electrical activity of 
the brain as largely irrelevant to the process of thought. the  way  in  which  evolution  has  selected  for  sensor­
neurological  couplings  with  the  environment  which  can 
be  very specialized.  By  choosing  the  right  sensors,  ani­
mals  can  often  get  by  with  very  little  neurological  pro­
cessing,  in  order  to  extract  just  the  right  information 
about  the  here  and  now  around  them,  for  the  task  at 
hand.  Complex  world  model  building  is  not  possible 
given  the sensors' limitations,  and  not  needed when the 
creature  is  appropriately  situated. 
[Cruse  90}  and  [Gotz  and  Wenking  73]  give  in­
sight  into how simple animals work,  based on  an under­
standing at a primitive level of their neurological circuits. 
These sorts of clues can help us as we try to build walking 
robots­for  examples  of such  computational  neuroethol­
ogy see  [Brooks  89]  and  [Beer  90]. 
These clues can help us build  better artificial systems, 
but  by  themselves  they  do  not  provide  us  with  a  full 
theory. 
5  Ideas 
Earlier  we  identified  situatedness,  embodiment,  intelli­
gence,  and  emergence,  with  a set of key  ideas  that  have 
lead  to  a  new  style  of  Artificial  Intelligence  research 
which  we are calling  behavior­based  robots.  In  this sec­
tion  1 expound on these four topics in  more detail. 
5.1  Situatedness 
Traditional  Artificial  Intelligence  has  adopted  a style  of 
research  where  the  agents  that  are  built  to  test  theories 
in  intelligence  are  essentially  problem  solvers  that  work 
in  an  symbolic  abstracted  domain.  The  symbols  may 
have referents in the minds of the builders of the systems, 
but there is nothing to ground those referents in any real 
world.  Furthermore,  the  agents  are  not  situated  in  a 
world  at  all.  Rather they  are given  a problem,  and  they 
solve it.  Then, they are given  another  problem and they 
solve  it.  They  are not  participating in  a  world  as would 
agents in  the  usual sense. 
In  these  systems  there  is  no  external  world  per  se, 
with  continuity,  surprises,  or  ongoing  history.  The  pro­
grams deal  only  with  a model world,  with  its own  built­
in  physics.  There  is  a  blurring  between  the  knowledge 
of  the  agent  and  the  world  it  is  supposed  to  be  oper­
ating  in—indeed  in  many  Artificial  Intelligence systems 
there  is  no  distinction  between  the  two—the  agent  has 
access  to  direct  and  perfect  perception,  and  direct  and 
perfect  action.  When  consideration  is  given  to  porting 
such agents or systems to operate in the world, the ques­
tion  arises of what sort  of representation  they  need of the 
real  world.  Over  the  years  within  traditional  Artificial 
Intelligence,  it  has  become  accepted  that  they  will need 
an  objective  model  of  the  world  with  individuated  en­
tities,  tracked  and  identified  over  time—the  models  of 
knowledge  representation  that  have  been  developed ex­
pect  and  require  such  a one­to­one  correspondence  be­
tween  the  world  and  the  agent's  representation  of it. 
The early robots such as Shakey and the Cart certainly 
followed  this  approach.  They  built  models of the  world, 
planned  paths around obstacles,  and  updated  their esti­
mate of where objects were relative to themselves as they 
moved.  We developed a different approach  [Brooks 86] 
where a mobile robot used the world as its own model— 
continuously  referring  to  its  sensors  rather  than  to  an 
internal  world  model.  The  problems of object  class  and 
identity disappeared.  The perceptual processing became 
much  simpler.  And  the  performance  of  the  robot  was 
better  in  comparable tasks  than  that of the  Cart
24,  and 
with  much  less  computation,  even  allowing  for  the  dif­
ferent  sensing  modalities. 
[Agre  88] and  [Chapman  90] formalized these ideas 
in  their  arguments  for  deictic  (or  indexcal­functional  in 
an  earlier  incarnation)  representations.  Instead  of hav­
ing  representations  of  individual  entities  in  the  world, 
the  system has  representations  in  terms  of the  relation­
ship  of the entities  to the  robot.  These  relationships  are 
both spatial and functional.  For instance in Pengi [Agre 
and  Chapman 87],  rather than refer to  Bee­27the  sys­
tem  refers  to  the­bee­thai­is­chasing­me­now.  The  latter 
may  or  may  not  be  the  same  bee  that  was  chasing  the 
robot  two minutes previously—it  doesn 't  matter for the 
particular  tasks  in  which  the  robot  is engaged. 
When  this  style  of representation  is  used  it  is  possi­
ble to build  computational systems which  trade off com­
putational  depth  for  computational  width.  The  idea  is 
that  the  computation  can  be  represented  by  a  network 
of gates,  timers,  and  state  elements.  The  network  does 
not  need  long  paths  from  inputs  (sensors)  to  outputs 
(actuators).  Any  computation  that  is  capable  of being 
done is done in a very short time span.  There have been 
other  approaches  which  address  a similar  time­bounded 
computation  issue,  namely  the  bounded  rationality  ap­
proach [Russell 89].  Those approaches try  to squeeze a 
traditional  Artificial  Intelligence  system  into  a bounded 
amount of computation.  With the new approach we tend 
to come from the other direction,  we start  with  very lit­
tle computation  and  build  up  the  amount, while staying 
away  from  the  boundary  of computation  that  takes  too 
long.  As  more  computation  needs  to  be  added  there  is 
a tendency to add  it  in  breadth  (thinking of the compu­
tation  as  being represented  by  a circuit  whose  depth  is 
the  longest  path  length  in  gates  from  input  to  output) 
rather  than  depth. 
A  situated  agent  must  respond  in  a  timely  fashion  to 
its  inputs.  Modeling  the  world  completely  under  these 
conditions  can  be  computationally  challenging.  But  a 
world  in  which  it  is  situated  also  provides  some  conti­
nuity to the  agent.  That  continuity  can  be  relied upon, 
so that the agent  can  use its perception  of the  world  in­
stead of an objective world model.  The representational 
primitives that are useful then change quite dramatically 
from  those  in  traditional  Artificial  Intelligence. 
The key idea from situatedness  is: 
The  world  is  its  own  best  model 
5.2  Embodiment 
There  are  two  reasons  that  embodiment  of  intelligent 
systems  is  critical.  First,  only  an  embodied  intelligent 
agent  is  fully  validated  as  one  that  can  deal  with  the 
24The tasks carried out by this first robot, Allen, were of a 
different class than those attempted by Shakey.  Shakey could 
certainly not have carried out the tasks that Allen did. 
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can  any internal symbolic or other system find a place to 
bottom out,  and  give  'meaning' to the processing  going 
on  within  the system. 
The  physical grounding of a robot  in  the world  forces 
its  designer  to  deal  with  all  the  issues.  If the  intelligent 
agent  has a body,  has  sensors,  and  has  actuators,  then 
all  the  details  and  issues  of being  in  the  world  must  be 
faced.  It is  no longer possible to argue in conference pa­
pers, that the simulated perceptual system is realistic, or 
that  problems of uncertainty in  action  will  not  be signif­
icant.  Instead, physical experiments can be done simply 
and  repeatedly.  There is no room  for  cheating2
5.  When 
this  is  done  it  is  usual  to  find  that  many  of the  prob­
lems  that  seemed  significant  are  not  so  in  the  physical 
system  (typically  'puzzle'  like situations  where symbolic 
reasoning seemed  necessary  tend  not  to arise in embod­
ied  systems),  and  many  that  seemed  non­problems  be­
come  major  hurdies  (typically  these  concern  aspects  of 
perception  and  action)
26. 
A  deeper  problem  is  "can  there  be  disembodied 
mind?".  Many  believe  that  what  is  human  about  us  is 
very  directly related to our  physical experiences.  For  in­
stance  [Johnson  87]  argues  that  a large  amount of our 
language  is  actually  metaphorically  related  to our  phys­
ical  connections to the world.  Our mental 'concepts' are 
based on  physically experienced  exemplars.  [Smith  91] 
suggests  that  without  physical  grounding  there  can  be 
no  halt  to the  regress  within  a knowledge  based  system 
as  it  tries  to  reason  about  real  world  knowledge  such 
as  that contained  in  an  encyclopedia  (e.g.,  [Lenat  and 
Feigenbaum  91]). 
Without  an  ongoing  participation  and  perception  of 
the  world  there is  no meaning  for  an  agent.  Everything 
is  random  symbols.  Arguments  might  be  made  that  at 
some level of abstraction even  the human  mind operates 
in  this  solipsist  position.  However,  biological  evidence 
(see section  4)  suggests  that  the human  mind's  connec­
tion  to  the  world  is  so  strong,  and  many  faceted,  that 
these  philosophical  abstractions  may  not  be  correct. 
The  key  idea from  embodiment  is: 
The  world  grounds  regress. 
5,3  Intelligence 
[Brooks  91a]  argues that  the  sorts of activities we  usu­
ally  think  of  as  demonstrating  intelligence  in  humans 
have  been  taking  place  for  only  a  very  small  fraction 
of our  evolutionary  lineage.  Further,  I  argue  that  the 
'simple'  things  to  do  with  perception  and  mobility  in  a 
dynamic environment took evolution  much longer to per­
fect, and  that all those capabilities are  a necessary basis 
for  'higher­level*  intellect. 
25l  mean  this in  the sense of causing self­delusion,  not in 
the sense of wrong doing with  intent. 
26In fact, there is some room for cheating as the physical 
environment  can  be specially  simplified  for  the  robot—and 
in  fact  it  may  be  very  hard  in  some cases  to identify  such 
self delusions.  In some research projects it may be necessary 
to test a particular class of robot activities,  and  therefore it 
may  be  necessary to build  a test environment  for the robot. 
There is a fine and difficult to define line to be drawn here. 
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Therefore,  I proposed  looking at simpler animals as a 
bottom­up model for building intelligence.  It is soon ap­
parent,  when  'reasoning'  is stripped  away  as  the  prime 
component  of a  robot's  intellect,  that  the  dynamics  of 
the interaction of the robot  and its environment are pri­
mary  determinants  of the  structure  of its  intelligence. 
Earlier,  [Simon  69]  had  discussed  a similar  point  in 
terms of an ant walking along the beach.  He pointed out 
that  the  complexity of the  behavior of the  ant  is more a 
reflection  of the  complexity  of its  environment  than  its 
own  internal  complexity.  He  speculated  that  the  same 
may  be  true  of  humans,  but  within  two  pages  of  text 
had  reduced studying  human  behavior  to the  domain  of 
crypto­arithmetic  problems. 
It is  hard to draw the line at what is intelligence, and 
what is environmental interaction.  In a sense it does not 
realty  matter  which  is  which,  as  all  intelligent  systems 
must  be  situated  in  some  world  or  other  if they  are  to 
be useful entities. 
The  key idea from intelligence  is: 
Intelligence  is  determined  by  the  dynamics  of 
interaction  with  the  world. 
5.4  Emergence 
In  discussing  where  intelligence  resides  in  an  Artificial 
Intelligence program  [Minsky  61]  points out that  "there 
is never any 'heart' in  a program"  and  "we  find  senseless 
loops  and  sequences  of trivial operations".  It  is  hard to 
point  at  a  single  component  as  the  seat  of intelligence. 
There  is  no  homunculus.  Rather,  intelligence  emerges 
from  the  interaction  of  the  components  of  the  system. 
The way  in  which it  emerges,  however, is  quite different 
for  traditional  and  behavior­based  Artificial  Intelligence 
systems. 
In  traditional  Artificial  Intelligence  the  modules  that 
are  defined  are  information  processing,  or  functional 
Typically  these  modules might  be  a perception  module, 
a planner,  a world  modeler,  a learner,  etc.  The compo­
nents directly participate in functions such as perceiving, 
planning,  modeling,  learning,  etc.  Intelligent  behavior 
of the system,  such  as  avoiding  obstacles,  standing up, 
controlling gaze, etc., emerges from the interaction of the 
components. 
In  behavior­based  Artificial  Intelligence  the  modules 
that are defined are behavior producing.  Typically these 
modules  might  be  an  obstacle  avoidance  behavior,  a 
standing up behavior,  a gaze control behavior, etc.  The 
components  directly  participate  in  producing  behaviors 
such as avoiding obstacles, standing up, controlling gaze, 
etc.  Intelligent  functionality  of the system,  such  as per­
ception, planning, modeling, learning, etc., emerges from 
the  interaction  of the  components. 
Although  this  dualism  between  traditional  and 
behavior­based systems looks pretty it is  not completely 
accurate.  Traditional systems have hardly ever been re­
ally  connected  to  the  world,  and  so  the  emergence  of 
intelligent  behavior is something more of an expectation 
in  most  cases,  rather  than  an established  phenomenon. 
Conversely,  because  of the  many  behaviors  present  in  a 
behavior­based system,  and  their individual dynamics of 
interaction  with  the  world,  it  is  often  hard  to  say  that a  particular  series  of actions  was  produced  by  a  partic­
ular  behavior.  Sometimes many  behaviors are operating 
simultaneously,  or  are  switching  rapidly  [Horswill  and 
Brooks  86], 
Over  the  years there  has  been  a lot  of work  on  emer­
gence  based  on  the  theme  of  self­organization  (e.g., 
[Nicolis  and  Prigogine  77]).  Within  behavior­based 
robots  there  is  beginning  to  be  work  at  better  charac­
terizing emergent functionality,  but  it  is still  in  its early 
stages, e.g., [Steels 90a].  He defines it as meaning that 
a  function  is  achieved  "indirectly  by  the  interaction  of 
more  primitive components  among themselves  and  with 
the  world". 
It is hard to identify the seat of intelligence within any 
system, as intelligence is produced by the interactions of 
many  components.  Intelligence  can  only  be determined 
by  the total behavior of the system and  how that behav­
ior  appears  in  relation  to  the  environment. 
The key  idea from emergence is; 
Intelligence  is  in  the  eye  of the  observer. 
6  Thought 
Since late  1984 I have  been building autonomous mobile 
robots  in  the  'Mobot  Lab'  at  the  MIT  Artificial  Intelli­
gence Laboratory;  [Brooks  86]  gives the original ideas, 
and  [Brooks  90b]  contains  a recent summary of the ca­
pabilities of the  robots  developed  in  my  laboratory  over 
the years. 
My  work  fits  within  the  framework  described  above 
in  terms  of situatedness,  embodiment,  intelligence  and 
emergence.  In  particular  I  have  advocated  situatedness, 
embodiment,  and  highly  reactive  architectures  with  no 
reasoning  systems,  no  manipulable  representations,  no 
symbols,  and  totally  decentralized  computation.  This 
different  model of computation  has  lead  to  radically dif­
ferent  models of thought, 
I  have  been  accused  of overstating  the  case  that  the 
new  approach  is  all  that  is  necessary  to  build  truly  in­
telligent systems.  It has even  been  suggested  that as an 
evangelist  I  have  deliberately overstated  my  case to pull 
people  towards  the  correct  level  of belief,  and  that  re­
ally  all  along,  I  have  known  that  a  hybrid  approach  is 
necessary. 
That  is  not  what  I  believe.  I  think  that  the  new  ap­
proach  can  be  extended  to  cover  the  whole  story,  both 
with  regards  to  building  intelligent  systems  and  to  un­
derstanding human  intelligence—the two principal goals 
identified  for  Artificial  Intelligence  at  the  beginning  of 
the  paper. 
Whether  I  am  right  or  not  is  an  empirical  question. 
Multiple  approaches  to  Artificial  Intelligence  will  con­
tinue  to  be  pursued.  At  some  point  we  will  be  able  to 
evaluate  which  approach  has been  more successful. 
In  this section  I  want  to outline  the  philosophical  un­
derpinnings  of my  work,  and  discuss  why  I  believe  the 
approach is the one that will in  the end  will prove dom­
inant. 
6.1  Principles 
All  research  goes  on  within  the  constraints  of  certain 
principles.  Sometimes these are explicit,  and sometimes 
they  are  implicit.  In  the  following  paragraphs  I  outline 
as explicitly as I can  the  principles followed. 
The  first  set  of principles  defines  the  domain  for  the 
work. 
•  The goal is to study  complete  integrated intelligent 
autonomous  agents. 
•  The  agents  should  be  embodied  as  mobile  robots, 
situated  in  unmodified  worlds  found  around  our 
laboratory
27.  This confronts the embodiment issue. 
The  environments  chosen  are  for  convenience,  al­
though  we strongly  resist  the  temptation  to  change 
the environments  in  any  way  for  the  robots. 
•  The  robots  should  operate  equally  well  when  vis­
itors,  or  cleaners,  walk  through  their  workspace, 
when furniture is rearranged, when lighting or other 
environmental  conditions  change,  and  when  their 
sensors and actuators drift in calibration.  This con­
fronts the situatedness  issue. 
•  The  robots  should  operate  on  timescales  commen­
surate  with  the  time  scales  used  by  humans.  This 
too confronts  the  situatedness  issue. 
The specific model of computation  used  was not  orig­
inally  based on  biological models.  It  was one  arrived  at 
by  continuously  refining attempts to program a robot to 
reactively avoid collisions in a people­populated environ­
ment,  [Brooks  86],  Now,  however,  in stating  the  prin­
ciples used in the model of computation,  it  is  clear that 
it  shares  certain  properties  with  models  of  how  neuro­
logical systems are  arranged.  It  is  important  to empha­
size  that  it  only  shares  certain  properties.  Our  model 
of computation  is  not  intended  as  a  realistic  model  of 
how  neurological  systems  work.  We  call  our  computa­
tion  model  the  sub  sumption  architecture  and  its  purpose 
is to program intelligent, situated, embodied  agents. 
Our  principles  of computation  are: 
•  Computation is  organized  as  an  asynchronous  net­
work  of  active  computational  elements  (they  are 
augmented  finite  state  machines—see  [Brooks  89] 
for details
28), with  a fixed topology  network of uni­
directional  connections. 
•  Messages  sent  over  connections  have  no  implicit 
semantics—they  are  small  numbers  (typically  8  or 
16  bits,  but  on  some  robots just  1  bit)  and  their 
meanings  are dependent  on  the  dynamics  designed 
into  both  the  sender  and  receiver. 
■  Sensors  and  actuators  are  connected  to  this  net­
work,  usually  through  asynchronous  two­sided 
buffers. 
27This  constraint  has  slipped  a  little  recently  as  we  are 
working on building prototype small legged  planetary rovers 
([Angle  and  Brooks  90]).  We  have  built  a  special  pur­
pose environment for the robots—a physically simulated lu­
nar surface. 
28For programming convenience we use a higher level ab­
straction  known  as  the  Behavior  Language,  documented  in 
[Brooks  90c].  It compiles down  to a  network of machines 
as described above. 
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ticular: 
•  The system can certainly have state—it is not at all 
constrained  to be  purely  reactive. 
•  Pointers  and  manipulable  data  structures  are  very 
hard to implement (since the model is Turing equiv­
alent  it  is  of course  possible,  but  hardly  within  the 
spirit). 
•  Any  search  space  must  be  quite  bounded  in  size, 
as search nodes cannot  be dynamically created and 
destroyed during the search process. 
•  There  is  no  implicit  separation  of  data  and  com­
putation,  they  are  both  distributed  over  the  same 
network  of elements. 
In  considering  the  biological  observations  outlined  in 
section 4, certain properties seemed worth incorporating 
into the way in which robots  are programmed within the 
given  model  of computation,  In  all  the  robots  built  in 
the  mobot  lab,  the  following  principles  of organization 
of intelligence have  been observed: 
•  There is  no central  model  maintained  of the  world. 
All data is distributed over many computational el­
ements. 
•  There  is no central  locus  of control. 
•  There is no separation into perceptual system, cen­
tral system, and actuation system.  Pieces of the net­
work may perform more than one of these functions. 
More  importantly,  there  is  intimate  intertwining of 
aspects  of all  three  of them. 
•  The  behavioral  competence  of  the  system  is  im­
proved  by adding more  behavior­specific  network  to 
the  existing network.  We  call  this  process  layering. 
This is a simplistic  and  crude  analogy  to evolution­
ary  development.  As  with evolution,  at every stage 
of  the  development  the  systems  are  tested—unlike 
evolution there  is  a gentle debugging process  avail­
able.  Each  of  the  layers  is  a  behavior­producing 
piece  of network  in  its  own  right,  although  it  may 
implicitly  rely  on  presence  of earlier  pieces  of  net­
work. 
•  There  is  no hierarchical  arrangement—i.e.,  there  is 
no  notion  of  one  process  calling  on  another  as  a 
subroutine.  Rather  the  networks  are  designed  so 
that  needed  computations  will  simply  be  available 
on the appropriate input line when needed.  There is 
no explicit synchronization  between  a producer and 
a  consumer  of messages.  Message  reception  buffers 
can be overwritten by new messages before the con­
sumer  has looked  at the  old  one.  It  is  not  atypical 
for  a message  producer  to send  10  messages for ev­
ery one  that  is examined  by  the receiver. 
•  The  layers,  or  behaviors,  all  run  in  parallel.  There 
may  need  to  be  a  conflict  resolution  mechanism 
when  different  behaviors  try  to  give  different  actu­
ator  commands. 
•  The  world  is  often  a good  communication  medium 
for  processes,  or behaviors,  within  a single robot. 
It  should  be  clear  that  these  principles  are  quite  dif­
ferent  to the ones  we have become  accustomed  to using 
as  we  program  Von  Neumann  machines.  It  necessarily 
forces  the programmer  to  use  a different style of organi­
zation  for  their  programs for  intelligence. 
There  are  also  always  influences  on  approaches  to 
building  thinking  machines  that  lie  outside  the  realm 
of  purely  logical  or  scientific  thought.  The  following, 
perhaps  arbitrary, principles have  also had  an influence 
on  the organization of intelligence that  has  been  used in 
Mobot  Lab  robots: 
•  A  decision  was  made early on  that  all  computation 
should  be  done  onboard  the  robots.  This  was  so 
that  the  robots  could  run  tether­free  and  without 
any  communication  link.  The  idea  is  to  download 
programs over  cables  (although  in  the  case of some 
of our  earlier  robots  the  technique  was  to plug  in  a 
newly written erasable ROM) into non­volatile stor­
age on  the  robots,  then  switch  them on  to interact 
with  and be situated  in  the environment. 
•  In  order  to  maintain  a long term  goal of being  able 
to eventually produce very tiny  robots ([Flynn 87]) 
the computational model has been restricted so that 
any specification  within  that  model  could  be rather 
easily  compiled  into  a  silicon  circuit.  This  has  put 
an  additional  constraint  on  designers  of agent  soft­
ware,  in  that  they  cannot  use  non­linear  numbers 
of connections between  collections  of computational 
elements,  as  that  would  lead  to severe silicon com­
pilation  problems.  Note  that  the  general  model  of 
computation  outlined  above  is  such  that  a goal  of 
silicon  compilation  is  in general  quite realistic. 
The  point  of section  3  was  to show  how  the  technol­
ogy of available  computation  had a major impact on the 
shape  of  the  developing  field  of  Artificial  Intelligence. 
Likewise  there  have  been  a  number  of influences  on  my 
own  work  that  are  technological  in  nature.  These  in­
clude: 
•  Given  the  smallness  in  overall  size  of  the  robots 
there  is  a  very  real  limitation  on  the  amount  of 
onboard  computation  that  can  be  carried,  and  by 
an  earlier  principle  all  computation  must  be  done 
onboard.  The  limiting  factor  on  the  amount  of 
portable  computation  is  not  weight  of the  comput­
ers directly, but the electrical power that is available 
to run them.  Empirically we have observed that the 
amount of electrical  power  available  is  proportional 
to  the  weight  of the  robot
29. 
•  Since  there  are  many  single  chip  microprocessors 
available  including  EEPROM  and  RAM,  it  is  be­
coming  more  possible  to  include  large  numbers  of 
sensors which  require  interrupt  servicing,  local  cal­
ibration, and data massaging.  The microprocessors 
29Jon Connell, a former member of the Mobot Lab, plotted 
data from a large number of mobile robots and noted the em­
pirical fact that there is roughly one watt of electrical power 
available for onboard computation for every pound of overall 
weight of the robot.  We call this  Connell 's Law. 
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ity  by  servicing  a  local  group  of  sensors  (e.g.,  all 
those  on  a single  leg  of a  robot)  in  situ,  and  pack­
aging up  the data to run over a communication  net­
work  to  the  behavior­producing  network. 
These principles have been used in the programming of 
a number of behavior­based  robots.  Below  we point out 
the  importance of some of these  robot  demonstrations in 
indicating how the subsumption  architecture (or one like 
it in spirit) can be expected to scale up to very intelligent 
applications.  In  what  follows  individual  references  are 
given  to  the  most  relevant  piece  of the  literature.  For 
a  condensed  description  of  what  each  of  the  robots  is 
and  how  they  are  programmed,  the  reader  should  see 
[Brooks  90bj;  it  also  includes  a number  of robots  not 
mentioned  here. 
6.2  Reactivity 
The  earliest  demonstration  of the subsumption  architec­
ture  was  on  the  robot  Allen  ([Brooks  86]).  It  was  al­
most entirely reactive, using sonar readings to keep away 
from  people  and  other  moving  obstacles,  while  not  col­
liding  with  static  obstacles.  It  also  had  a  non­reactive 
higher  level  layer  that  would  select  a  goal  to  head  to­
wards,  and then proceed  to that location while the lower 
level  reactive  layer  took  care of avoiding  obstacles. 
The very  first  subsumption  robot  thus combined non­
reactive  capabilities  with  reactive  ones.  But  the  impor­
tant  point  is  that  it  used  exactly  the same  sorts of com­
putational  mechanism  to  do  both.  In  looking  at  the 
network  of  the  combined  layers  there  was  no  obvious 
partition  into  lower  and  higher  level  components  based 
on  the  type  of information  flowing  on  the  connections, 
or  the  state  machines  that  were  the  computational  el­
ements.  To  be  sure,  there  was  a  difference  in  function 
between  the  two  layers,  but  there  was  no  need  to  in­
troduce  any  centralization  or  explicit  representations  to 
achieve a higher level, or later, process having useful and 
effective  influence over  a  lower  level. 
The second  robot,  Herbert ([Connell  89]),  pushed on 
the  reactive  approach.  It  used  a  laser  scanner  to  find 
soda can­like objects  visually,  infrared  proximity sensors 
to  navigate  by  following  walls  and  going  through  door­
ways,  a magnetic compass  to  maintain  a global sense of 
orientation, and  a host of sensors on an  arm which  were 
sufficient to reliably pick up soda cans.  The task for Her­
bert  was  to  wander  around  looking  for  soda  cans,  pick 
one up,  and  bung  it  back  to  where  Herbert  had  started 
from.  It  was demonstrated  reliably  finding  soda cans in 
rooms  using  its  laser  range  finder  (some  tens  of trials), 
picking up soda cans many times (over 100 instances), re­
liably navigating (many hours of runs), and in one finale 
doing  all  the  tasks  together  to  navigate,  locate,  pickup 
and  return  with  a soda can
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In  programming  Herbert  it  was  decided  that  it should 
maintain  no  state  longer  than  three  seconds,  and  that 
there  would  be  no internal  communication  between  be­
havior  generating  modules.  Each  one  was  connected  to 
30The limiting factor on Herbert was the mechanical seat­
ing of its chips—its  mean  time between  chip seating failure 
was no more than 15 minutes. 
sensors on the input side, and a fixed priority arbitration 
network  on  the  output  side.  The  arbitration  network 
drove  the  actuators. 
In  order  to  carry  out  its  tasks,  Herbert,  in  many  in­
stances, had to use the world as its own best model and 
as a communication medium.  E.g., the laser­based soda 
can  object  finder  drove  the  robot  so  that  its  arm  was 
lined  up  in  front  of the  soda  can.  But  it  did  not  tell 
the  arm controller that there was now  a soda can  ready 
to be  picked  up.  Rather,  the  arm  behaviors  monitored 
the shaft encoders on the wheels, and when they noticed 
that  there was no body  motion,  initiated  motions of the 
arm,  which  in  turn  triggered  other  behaviors,  so  that 
eventually  the  robot  would  pick  up  the soda can. 
The  advantage of this  approach  is  was  that  there  was 
no need to set up internal expectations for what was go­
ing  to  happen  next;  that  meant  that  the  control  system 
could  both  (1)  be  naturally  opportunistic  if  fortuitous 
circumstances presented themselves, and (2) it could eas­
ily respond to changed circumstances, such as some other 
object  approaching it  on  a collision  course. 
As  one  example  of how  the  arm  behaviors  cascaded 
upon one another, consider actually grasping a soda can. 
The  hand  had  a  grasp  reflex  that  operated  whenever 
something  broke  an  infrared  beam  between  the fingers. 
When the arm located a soda can with  its local sensors, 
it simply drove the hand so that  the two fingers lined up 
on  either side of the  can.  The  hand  then  independently 
grasped the can.  Given this arrangement, it was possible 
for  a human  to hand  a soda  can  to  the  robot.  As soon 
as it  was grasped,  the arm  retracted­it  did  not  matter 
whether it was a soda can that was intentionally grasped, 
or  one that magically  appeared.  The  same opportunism 
among  behaviors  let  the  arm  adapt  automatically  to  a 
wide  variety  of cluttered  desktops,  and  still  successfully 
find the soda  can. 
In order  to return  to where  it  came from after picking 
up a soda can, Herbert used a trick.  The navigation rou­
tines could carry implement rules such  as:  when passing 
through  a  door  southbound,  turn  left.  These  rules  were 
conditionahzed  on  the  separation  of the  fingers  on  the 
hand.  When  the  robot  was  outbound  with  no  can  in 
its  hand,  it  effectively  executed  one  set  of rules.  After 
picking  up  a  can,  it  would  execute  a  different  set.  By 
carefully  designing  the  rules,  Herbert  was  guaranteed, 
with  reasonable  reliability,  to retrace  its  path. 
The  point  of Herbert  is  two­fold. 
•  It  demonstrates  complex,  apparently  goal  directed 
and  intentional,  behavior  in  a system which  has no 
long  term  internal  state  and  no  internal  communi­
cation. 
•  It  is  very  easy  for  an  observer  of  a  system  to  at­
tribute more complex internal  structure  than  really 
exists.  Herbert  appeared  to  be  doing  things  like 
path planning and map building, even though it was 
not. 
6.3  Representation 
My earlier paper [Brooks  91a]  is often  criticized for ad­
vocating absolutely no representation of the world within 
a behavior­based robot.  This criticism is invalid.  I make 
Brooks  587 it  clear  in  the  paper  that  I  reject  traditional  Artificial 
Intelligence  representation  schemes  (see  section  5).  I 
also  made  it  clear  that  I  reject  explicit  representations 
of goals  within  the  machine. 
There can, however, be representations which are par­
tial  models  of the  world—in  fact  I  mentioned  that  "in­
dividual  layers  extract  only  those  aspects  of  the  world 
which they find relevant—projections of a representation 
into a simple subspace"  [Brooks  91a].  The form these 
representations take, within the context of the computa­
tional  model we are using, will depend on the particular 
task  those  representations  are  to  be  used  for.  For  more 
general  navigation  than  that  demonstrated  by  Connelt 
it  may sometimes
31  need to build  and  maintain  a map. 
[Mataric  DO,  91]  introduced  active­constructive  rep­
resentations  to  subsurnption  in  a  sonar­based  robot, 
Toto,  which wandered around office environments build­
ing a map  based on  landmarks,  and then used that map 
to  get  from  one  location  to  another.  Her  representa­
tions  were  totally  decentralized  and  non­manipulable, 
and  there  is  certainly  no  central  control  which  build, 
maintains,  or  uses  the  maps.  Rather,  the  map  itself is 
an  active structure  which  does  the  computations  neces­
sary  for  any  path  planning  the  robot  needs  to  do. 
Primitive layers of control let Toto wander around fol­
lowing  boundaries  (such  as  walls  and  furniture  clutter) 
in  an  indoor  environment.  A  layer  which  detects land­
marks,  such  as  flat  clear  walls,  corridors,  etc.,  runs  in 
parallel.  It  informs  the  map  layer  as  its  detection  cer­
tainty exceeds a fixed threshold.  The map is represented 
as a graph internally.  The nodes of the graph are compu­
tational  elements  (they  are  identical  little  subnetworks 
of distinct  augmented  finite  state  machines).  Free nodes 
arbitrate and allocate themselves,  in  a purely local fash­
ion, to represent a new landmark, and set up topological 
links to physically neighboring nodes (using a limited ca­
pacity  switching  network  to  keep  the  total  virtual  'wire 
length' between  finite  state  machines  to be linear in  the 
map  capacity).  These  nodes  keep  track  of  where  the 
robot  is  physically,  by  observing  changes  in  the output 
of  the  landmark  detector,  and  comparing  that  to  pre­
dictions  they  have  made  by  local  message  passing,  and 
by  referring  to other  more  primitive  (magnetic  compass 
based)  coarse  position estimation  schemes. 
When  a  higher  layer  wants  the  robot  to  go  to  some 
known  landmark,  it  merely  'excites',  in  some  particular 
way  the  particular  place  in  the  map  that  it  wants  to 
go.  The  excitation  (this  is  an  abstraction  programmed 
into the  particular  finite  state machines used  here—it  is 
not  a  primitive—as  such  there  could  be  many  different 
types of excitation  co­existing  in  the  map,  if other types 
of planning are required) is spread  through  the map fol­
lowing  topological  links,  estimating  total  path  link,  and 
arriving  at  the  landmark­thai­I'm­at­now  node  (a  deictic 
representation)  with  a recommendation  of the  direction 
to  travel  right  now  to  follow  the  shortest  path.  As  the 
robot  moves  so  to  does  its  representation  of  where  it 
31 Note  that  we are saying only  sometimes,  not  must—there 
are  many  navigation  tasks  doable  by  mobile  robots  which 
appear intelligent,  but  which do  not  require  map information 
at  all. 
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is,  and  at  that  new  node  the  arriving  excitation  tells  it 
where to go next.  The map thus bears a similarity to the 
internalized plans of [Payton  90],  but  it  represented  by 
the  same  computational  elements  that  use  it—there  is 
no  distinction  between  data and  process.  Furthermore 
Mataric's  scheme  can  have  multiple  simultaneously  ac­
tive goals—the robot  will simply head towards the near­
est one. 
This  work  demonstrates  the  following  aspects  of 
behavior­based or  subsurnption systems: 
•  Such systems can make predictions about  what will 
happen in the world,  and have expectations. 
•  Such systems can make plans—but they are not the 
same as traditional Artificial Intelligence plans—see 
[Agre  and  Chapman  90]  for  an  analysis  of this 
issue. 
•  Such  systems  can  have  goals—see  [Maes  90b]  for 
another  way  to  implement  goals  within  the  ap­
proach. 
•  All  these  things  can  be  done  without  resorting  to 
central  representations. 
•  All  these  things  can  be  done  without  resorting  to 
manipulable  representations. 
•  All  these  things  can  be  done  without  resorting  to 
symbolic  representations. 
6.4  Complexity 
Can  subsumption­like  approaches  scale  to  arbitrarily 
complex systems?  This is a question  that cannot be an­
swered  affirmatively  right  now—just  as  it  is  totally  un­
founded to answer the same question affirmatively in the 
case of traditional symbolic  Artificial  Intelligence  meth­
ods.  The  best  one  can  do  is  point  to  precedents  and 
trends. 
There  are  a  number  of  dimensions  along  which  the 
scaling question can be asked.  E.g., 
•  Can the approach work well as the environment be­
comes  more  complex? 
•  Can  the  approach  handle  larger numbers of sensors 
and  actuators? 
•  Can the approach work smoothly as more and more 
layers or  behaviors  are  added? 
We answer each of these in turn in  the following para­
graphs. 
The approach  taken  at  the  Mobot  Lab  has been  that 
from day one  always  test  the  robot in  the most complex 
environment  for  which  it  is  ultimately  destined.  This 
forces even the simplest  levels  to handle  the most  com­
plex  environment  expected.  So  for  a  given  robot  and 
intended environment the scaling question is handled by 
the  methodology  chosen  for  implementation.  But  there 
is  also  the  question  of  how  complex  are  the  environ­
ments  that  are  targeted  for  with  the  current  generation 
of robots.  Almost all of our robots have been  tested and 
operated  in  indoor  environments  with  people unrelated 
to  the  research  wandering  through  their  work  area  at 
will.  Thus  we  have  a  certain  degree  of confidence  that the  same  basic  approach  will  work  in  outdoor  environ­
ments  (the  sensory  processing  will  have  to  change  for 
some  sensors)  with  other  forms  of  dynamic  action  tak­
ing place. 
The number of sensors and  actuators possessed by to­
day's robots are pitiful when compared to the numbers in 
even simple  organisms such  as  insects.  Our first robots 
had only a handful of identical sonar sensors and two mo­
tors.  Later  a six legged  walking robot  was built  [Angle 
89],  It  had  12  actuators  and  20  sensors,  and  was  suc­
cessfully programmed  in subsumption  ([Brooks  89])  to 
walk  adaptively over  rough  terrain.  The key  was to find 
the  right  factoring  into sensor  and  actuator  subsystems 
so  that  interactions  between  the  subsystems  could  be 
minimized.  A  new six  legged  robot,  recently  completed 
([Brooks  and  Angle  90],  is  much  more  challenging, 
but still nowhere near the complexity of insects.  It has 23 
actuators  and  over  150 sensors.  With  this level of sens­
ing it is  possible  to start  to  develop  some  of the  'senses' 
that  animals  and  humans  have,  such  as  a  kinesthetic 
sense—this  comes  from  the  contributions  of  many  sen­
sor  readings.  Rather,  than  feed  into  a geometric  model 
the  sensors  into  a  estimate  of bodily  motion.  There  is 
also the question of the types of sensors used.  [Horswill 
and  Brooks  88]  generalized  the subsumption  architec­
ture  so that  some of the  connections between  processing 
elements  could  be  a  retina  bus,  a  cable  that  transmit­
ted  partially  processed  images  from  one site  to  another 
within the system.  The robot so programmed was able to 
follow  corridors  and  follow  moving objects  in  real  time. 
As  we  add  more  layers  we  find  that  the  interactions 
can  become  more  complex.  [Maes  89]  introduced  the 
notion  of switching  whole  pieces  of the  network  on  and 
ofT,  using  an  activation scheme  for  behaviors.  That  idea 
is  now  incorporated  into  the subsumption  methodology 
[Brooks  90c], and  provides a way of implementing both 
competition  and  cooperation  between  behaviors.  At  a 
lower  level  a  hormone­like  system  has  been  introduced 
([Brooks  91b])  which  models  the  hormone  system  of 
the lobster  [Kravitz  88]  ([Arkin  88]  had  implemented 
a system with similar inspiration).  With these additional 
control  mechanisms  we  have  certainly  bought ourselves 
breathing  room  to  increase  the  performance  of our  sys­
tems  markedly.  The  key  point  about  these  control  sys­
tems  is  that  they fit exactly into the existing structures, 
and  are  totally  distributed  and  local in  their operations. 
6.5  Learning 
Evolution  has  decided  that  there  is  a  tradeoff  between 
what  we know  through our genes and what we must find 
out for ourselves as we develop.  We can expect to see  a 
similar  tradeoff for  our  behavior­based  robots. 
There  are  at  least  four  classes  of  things  that  can  be 
learned: 
1.  representations of the  world  that  help  in  some  task 
2.  aspects of instances of sensors and actuators (this is 
sometimes  called  calibration) 
3.  the  ways  in  which  individual  behaviors  should  in­
teract 
4.  new  behavioral  modules 
The robots in the  Mobot  Lab  have  been programmed 
to demonstrate the  first  three  of these  types of learning. 
The last one  has not  yet  been successfully tackled
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Learning representations of the world was already dis­
cussed above concerning the work of [Mataric  90,  91]. 
The  next  step  will  be  to  generalize  active­constructive 
representations  to  more  classes of use. 
[Viola  90]  demonstrated  calibration  of  a  complex 
head­eye  system  modeling  the  primate  vestibulo­ocular 
system.  In this system there is one fast channel between 
a gyroscope and a high performance pan­tilt head hold­
ing the camera, and a slower channel using vision which 
produces  correction  signals  for  the  gyroscope  channel. 
The  same  system  was  used  to  learn  how  to  accurately 
saccade  to moving stimuli. 
Lastly,  [Maes and Brooks  90]  programmed an early 
six legged robot  to learn  to  walk  using the subsumption 
architecture along with the behavior  activation schemes 
of [Maes  89].  Independent behaviors on each  leg moni­
tored the  activity of other behaviors and correlated that, 
their  own  activity  state,  and  the  results  from  a  belly 
switch  which  provided  negative  feedback,  as  input  to a 
local learning rule which learned  under which  conditions 
it was to operate the behavior.  After  about 20  trials per 
leg, spread over a total of a minute or two, the robot re­
liably learns the alternating tripod gait—it slowly seems 
to emerge  out  of initially  chaotic  flailing  of the  legs. 
Learning within  subsumption  is in  its early stages but 
it has been demonstrated in  a number of different critical 
modes  of development. 
6.6  Vistas 
The behavior­based approach has been demonstrated on 
situated  embodied systems  doing things that  traditional 
Artificial  Intelligence would  have  tackled  in  quite  differ­
ent  ways.  What  are  the  key  research  areas  that  need 
to  be  addressed  in  order  to  push  behavior­based  robots 
towards  more  and  more  sophisticated  capabilities? 
In this section  we outline research  challenges  in  three 
categories  or  levels
  33: 
•  Understanding  the  dynamics  of  how  an  individ­
ual  behavior  couples  with  the  environment  via the 
robot's  sensors  and  actuators.  The  primary  con­
cerns here  are  what  forms  of perception  are  neces­
sary,  and  what  relationships  exist  between  percep­
tion,  internal  state,  and  action  (i.e.,  how  behavior 
is specified or  described). 
•  Understanding  how  many  behaviors  can  be  inte­
grated  into  a  single  robot.  The  primary  concerns 
here  are  how  independent  various  perceptions  and 
behaviors can be, how much they must rely on, and 
interfere  with  each  other,  how  a  competent  com­
plete robot can  be built in such  a way  as to accom­
modate  all  the  required  individual  behaviors,  and 
We did have a failed attempt at this through simulated 
evolution—this is the approach taken by many in the Artifi­
cial Life movement. 
33The reader is referred to [Brooks 90a] for a more com­
plete discussion of these issues. 
Brooks  589 to  what  extent  apparently  complex  behaviors  can 
emerge from simple  reflexes. 
•  Understanding how multiple robots  (either  a homo­
geneous,  or  a heterogeneous group)  can  interact  as 
they go about their business.  The primary concerns 
here  are  the relationships  between  individuals'  be­
haviors , the amount  and  type of communication be­
tween  robots,  the  way  the  environment  reacts  to 
multiple  individuals,  and  the  resulting  patterns  of 
behavior  and  their  impacts  upon  the  environment 
(which  night  not  occur  in  the  case  of isolated  indi­
viduals). 
Just as research in Artificial Intelligence is broken into 
subfields,  these  categories  provide  subfields  of behavior­
based robots  within  which it is possible  to concentrate  a 
particular research project.  Some of these topics are the­
oretical  in  nature,  contributing  to  a science of behavior­
based systems.  Others are engineering in nature, provid­
ing  tools  and  mechanisms  for  successfully  building  and 
programming behavior­based  robots.  Some of these top­
ics  have  already  been  touched  upon  by  researchers  in 
behavior­based  approaches,  but  none  of  them  are  yet 
solved  or  completely  understood. 
At  the  individual  behavior  level  some of the important 
issues are as follows; 
Convergence:  Demonstrate  or  prove  that  a  specified 
behavior  is  such  that  the  robot  will  indeed  carry 
out  the  desired  task  successfully.  For  instance,  we 
may  want  to  give  some  set  of initial  conditions  for 
a robot,  and  some limitations  on  possible worlds in 
which it is placed, and show  that under those condi­
tions,  the robot  is guaranteed  to follow  a particular 
wall,  rather than  diverge  and  get  lost. 
Synthesis:  Given  a  particular  task,  automatically  de­
rive a behavior specification for  the creature so that 
it  carries  out  that  task  in  a  way  which  has  clearly 
demonstrable convergence.  I do  not expect progress 
in  this  topic  in  the  near  future. 
Complexity:  Deal  with  the  complexity  of  real  world 
environments,  and  sift  out  the  relevant  aspects  of 
received  sensations  rather  than  being  overwhelmed 
with  a multitude of data. 
Learning:  Develop  methods  for  the  automatic  acqui­
sition  of new  behaviors,  and  the  modification  and 
tuning  of existing  behaviors. 
As  multiple behaviors  are  built  into a single robot  the 
following issues need  to be addressed: 
Coherence:  Even  though  many  behaviors  may  be  ac­
tive  at  once,  or  are  being  actively  switched  on  or 
off,  the  robot  should  still  appear  to  an  observer  to 
have  coherence  of action  and  goals.  It  should  not 
be  rapidly  switching  between  inconsistent  behav­
iors, nor  should  two behaviors be  active  simultane­
ously,  if they  interfere  with  each  other  to  the  point 
that  neither  operates  successfully. 
Relevance:  The behaviors that are active should be rel­
evant to the situation  the  robot finds itself in—e.g., 
it should  recharge  itself when  the  batteries  are  low, 
not  when  they  are full. 
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Adequacy:  The  behavior  selection  mechanism  must 
operate in such  a way that  the long term goals that 
the  robot  designer  has  for  the  robot  are  met—e.g., 
a  floor  cleaning  robot should  successfully  clean  the 
floor in  normal  circumstances,  besides doing all the 
ancillary  tasks  that  are  necessary  for  it  to  be  suc­
cessful  at  that. 
Representation:  Multiple  behaviors  might  want  to 
share  partial  representations  of the  world—in  fact 
the  representations of world  aspects  might  generate 
multiple  behaviors when  activated  appropriately. 
Learning:  The  performance  of  a  robot  might  be  im­
proved by  adapting the ways in which  behaviors in­
teract, or  are activated, as a result of experience. 
When  many  behavior­based  robots  start  to  interact 
there are a whole new host of issues which arise.  Many of 
these same issues would arise if the robots were built us­
ing  traditional  Artificial  Intelligence methods,  but  there 
has been very little published in  these  areas. 
Emergence:  Given a set of behaviors programmed into 
a set  of robots,  we  would  like  to  be  able  to  predict 
what  the global  behavior  of the system will  be,  and 
as a consequence determine the differential effects of 
small changes to the  individual robots on the global 
behavior. 
Synthesis:  AS  at single behavior level, given a particu­
lar task, automatically  derive a program for the set 
of robots so  that  they  carry  out  the  task. 
Communication:  Performance  may  be  increased  by 
increasing  the  amount  of  explicit  communication 
between  robots,  but  the  relationship  between  the 
amount of communication increase and performance 
increase  needs to be  understood. 
Cooperation:  In some circumstances  robots should be 
able  to achieve  more  by  cooperating—the  form and 
specification  of such  possible  cooperations  need  to 
be understood. 
Interference:  Robots  may  interfere  with  one  another. 
Protocols  for  avoiding  this  when  it  is  undesirable 
must  be included  in  the  design  of the creatures' in­
structions. 
Density  dependence:  The global  behavior of the sys­
tem  may  be  dependent  on  the  density  of the  crea­
tures  and  the  resources  they  consume  within  the 
world.  A  characterization  of this  dependence  is  de­
sirable.  At  the  two  ends  of the  spectrum it  may  be 
the case that (a)  a single robot given  n  units of time 
performs identically to n robots each given  1  unit of 
time, and (2) the global task  might not  be achieved 
at  all if there are fewer than, say,  m robots. 
Individuality:  Robustness can be achieved if all robots 
are  interchangeable.  A  fixed  number  of  classes  of 
robots,  where  all  robots  within  a  class  are  identi­
cal, is also robust,  but somewhat  less so.  The issue 
then  is to, given  a task, decide how many classes of 
creatures  are necessary 
Learning:  The performance of the  robots may increase 
in  two  ways  through  learning.  At  one  level,  when one robot learns some skill if might  be able to trans­
fer it to another.  At another  level,  the robots might 
learn  cooperative strategies. 
These  are  a  first  cut  at  topics  of  interest  within 
behavior­based approaches.  As we explore more we will 
find more  topics,  and  some  that  seem  interesting  now 
will  turn  out  to be  irrelevant. 
6.7  Thinking 
Can  this  approach  lead  to  thought?  How  could  it?  It 
seems  the  antithesis of thought.  But  we  must  ask  first, 
what is thought?  Like intelligence this  is a very slippery 
concept. 
We only know that thought exists in biological systems 
through  our own  introspection.  At one  level we identify 
thought  with  the product  of our  consciousness,  but  that 
too is a contentious subject, and one which has had little 
attention  from  Artificial  Intelligence. 
My  feeling  is  that  thought  and  consciousness are epi­
phenomena  of  the  process  of  being  in  the  world.  As 
the complexity of the  world  increases,  and  the complex­
ity  of processing  to  deal  with  that  world  rises,  we  will 
see  the  same  evidence  of thought  and  consciousness  in 
our  systems  as  we  see  in  people  other  than  ourselves 
now.  Thought  and  consciousness  will  not  need  to  be 
programmed  in.  They  will emerge. 
7  Conclusion 
The  title  of  this  paper  is  intentionally  ambiguous. 
The  following  interpretations  all  encapsulate  important 
points. 
•  An  earlier  paper  [Brooks  91a]
34  was  titled  Inielli­
gevce  without  Representation.  The  thesis  of that pa­
per was that intelligent behavior could be generated 
without  having explicit  manipulable  internal  repre­
sentations.  Intelligence  without  Reason  is thus  com­
plementary, stating that  intelligent  behavior can  be 
generated without having explicit reasoning systems 
present. 
•  Intelligence  without  Reason  can  be  read  as  a state­
ment  that  intelligence  is  an  emergent  property  of 
certain  complex systems­—it sometimes  arises with­
out  an  easily  identifiable  reason for  arising. 
•  Intelligence  without  Reason can  be  viewed  as a com­
mentary on the bandwagon effect in research in gen­
eral, and in particular in the case of Artificial Intelli­
gence research.  Many lines of research  have become 
goals  of  pursuit  in  their  own  right,  with  little  re­
call  of the  reasons  for  pursuing  those  lines.  A  little 
grounding  occasionally  can  go  a  long  way  towards 
helping keep  things on  track. 
•  Intelligence  without  Reason  is  also  a  commentary 
on  the  way evolution  built  intelligence—rather than 
reason  about  how  to  build  intelligent  systems,  it 
used  a  generate  and  test strategy.  This  is  in  stark 
contrast  to  the  way  all  human  endeavors  to  build 
34Despite  the  publication  date  it  was  written  in  1986  and 
1987T  and  was complete in  its  published  form  in  1987. 
intelligent  systems  must  inevitably  proceed.  Fur­
thermore  we  must  be  careful  in  emulating  the  re­
sults  of evolution—there  may  be  many  structures 
and  observable  properties  which  are  suboptimal  or 
vestigial. 
We are a long way from creating Artificial Intelligences 
that measure up the  to the  standards of early ambitions 
for the  field.  It is a complex endeavor and we sometimes 
need  to step  back  and  question  why  we  are  proceeding 
in the direction we are going,  and  look  around for other 
promising  directions. 
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